


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RESTRICTED

FINAL REPORT

G-2 SECTION
Headquarters, 6TH Army Group



WORLD WAR II

RESTRICTED

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
G-2 Section U. S. Army

FINAL REPORT

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CHAPTER 1

GENERAL

1. On 1 August 1944 Headquarters 6th Army Group was activated. As an item of interest a copy of the NATOUSA letter authorizing the activation is shown in Figure 1. The initial Headquarters was at BASTIA, CORSICA and the month of August was devoted to organizing the section and training the officers and enlisted men for their jobs.

2. In keeping with the desire of the Army Group Commander to establish a small headquarters, it was organized on the basis of T/O & E 200-1 applicable to an army. An organizational chart is shown in Figure 2. The officer and enlisted man allotment for G-2 was as follows:

Generals and Colonels	4
Lieutenant Colonels	5
Majors	9
Captains	6
1st Lieutenants	2

TOTAL OFFICERS	26
----------------	----

Warrant Officer	1
Grade 1	4
Grade 2	6
Grade 3	7
Grade 4	9
Grade 5	6
Grade 6	2

TOTAL E.M.	34
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AGGREGATE	61
-----------	----

3. A resume of the functions of G-2 subsections follows:

The G-2 Section functioned in accordance with directives of Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F., and generally as outlined below. Basic operations were in accordance with normal U. S. staff procedures.

a. Operational Intelligence

Collect, evaluate and distribute information of enemy units by:

(1) Maintaining enemy order of battle on a divisional component level for 6th Army Group and adjacent fronts.

R E S T R I C T E D

Downgraded to RESTRICTED 10 July 1945

171

RAS/af

HEADQUARTERS
NORTH AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 534

: : : : : : : : : :
: S E C R E T :
: AUTH: CG, NATOUSA :
: Initials: /s/ :
: 1 August 1944 :
: : : : : : : : : :

AG 322/106 A-0

1 August 1944

SUBJECT: Activation of the 6th Army Group.

TO : All Concerned.

1. Effective 0001B hours, 1 August 1944, the 6th Army Group consisting of the following units is activated in accordance with the specific columns of the current T/O's indicated below:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>T/O Column</u>	<u>T/O</u>
Headquarters, 6th Army Group	22	200-1
Headquarters Co, 6th Army Gp	7	200-2
Special Troops, 6th Army Gp	3 and 7	200-3

2. The 6th Army Group and units thereof are assigned to NATOUSA.

3. Personnel will be assigned to, and equipment issued to, the 6th Army Group only as approved by this headquarters.

4. The 6th Army Group will be serviced by the 21st Machine Records Unit.

5. a. Initial rosters will be prepared and forwarded in accordance with AR 345-900.

b. The appropriate data (see paragraph 18, AR 345-800) will be entered in the morning report of each unit in accordance with Section III, AR 345-400, as modified by paragraph 3g, letter this headquarters, AG 330.33/100-S, dated 29 July 1943, subject: "Adoption of New Morning Report".

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

/s/ R. A. Stukey
/t/ R. A. STUKEY,
1st Lt., AGD,
Asst Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - G-1	1 - AG Stats
1 - G-2	2 - AG Records
1 - G-3	1 - AG Pers
1 - G-4	1 - AG M&D
5 - AFHQ, Adv Det.	
2 - CO, Hq Comd, AF	

Figure 1

- 2 -

R E S T R I C T E D




Figure 2

(2) Keeping enemy order of battle on a divisional level in other areas as reported.

(3) Preparing Section I of the Daily 6th Army Group COSITINTREP.

(4) Submitting special intelligence reports upon specific request.

NOTE: The daily ISUM, G-2 Report, and Information Bulletin remained a function of Army. This section issued a Weekly Intelligence summary covering ground, air, and naval operational intelligence, as well as counter-intelligence.

b. Counter Intelligence

Supervise the regulation of measures other than tactical to preserve secrecy in the categories listed below and in the areas for which subordinate units were responsible

(1) Security of Military Information.

(a) Violations by military personnel.

(b) Communications monitoring.

(c) Codes and cipher procedures.

(d) Censorship of mail - military personnel and Prisoners of War.

(2) Security of Personnel.

(a) Military personnel investigations.

(b) Counter propaganda measures.

(3) Security of Materiel.

(a) Counter-sabotage measures.

(b) Control of coastlines, borders, and boundaries from a counter-intelligence standpoint.

(c) Security of Headquarters 6th Army Group.

(4) Supervision of procedures incident to the apprehension of enemy agents, suspects and refugees, interrogation and disposition of same.

(5) Supervision of measures taken to control civilians to include movement, curfew, surrender of arms, etc.

(6) Liaison with French and American CI agencies relative to civilian matters.

c. Signal Intelligence

Supervise the direction of signal intelligence agencies of armies and subordinate units in obtaining, exploiting, and distributing information and maintaining adequate security measures.

d. Technical Intelligence

Supervise the collection, examination, and dissemination of information concerning captured enemy materiel. To provide all concerned with the capabilities, characteristics, and methods of operation and neutralization of enemy equipment in use, or likely to be brought into use.

e. "T" Section

Coordinate the exploitation of intelligence targets assigned to "T" Force and "T" Sections of Armies.

(1) Prevent duplication of research and investigation of industrial, military, ministerial, and governmental targets.

(2) Provide and maintain a security system for intelligence targets.

(3) Establish a Specialist Camp for the reception, billeting, authenticating, and supervising of the intelligence specialists ordered into the 6th Army Group area.

f. Attached Agencies

(1) ALSOS Mission - A War Department agency for the collection of special intelligence.

(2) CIC - Counter Intelligence Corps. The operating agency of counter intelligence.

(3) Civil Censorship - A detachment to supervise the seizing and processing of captured enemy mail, and the control and censorship of all communications other than Allied military.

(4) MIS Teams - Military Intelligence Service Teams composed of Interrogation Prisoner of War (IPW), Military Intelligence

Interpreter (MII), Order of Battle (OB), Photo Interpreter (PI), and Document Teams.

(5) OSS - Office of Strategic Services. A governmental agency with a wide variety of missions; for this headquarters a liaison detachment.

(6) SCI - Special Counter Intelligence. An operating agency for the collection of special counter intelligence information.

(7) SLU - Special Liaison Unit. An agency for the collection of special information.

(8) SM - Securite Militaire. The French counter intelligence agency.

(9) "T" Force - An intelligence assault force for seizing and guarding important intelligence targets, and for coordinating the exploitation of these targets. This unit was assigned to 6th Army Group and under operational control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

4. The closing roster of the G-2 Section was as follows:

OFFICERS

Brig General	Eugene L. Harrison, GSC
Colonel	David G. Erskine, GSC
Colonel	William E. Maulsby, Jr, GSC
Lt Colonel	Innes Randolph, MI
Lt Colonel	Andrew J. Torrielli, FA
Lt Colonel	Herrick F. Bearce, SC
Lt Colonel	Henry Frankel, INF
Lt Colonel	Robert N. Denniston, INF
Lt Colonel	William C. Hobbs, Jr, CAV
Major	Paul C. Westerman, INF
Major	John R. Draper, Jr, QMC
Major	Richard A. Montgomery, CAV
Major	Paul C. Lindsey, CAC
Major	George Wolf, CAV
Major	Peter G. Chicos, INF
Captain	Sidney Reisberg, INF
Captain	George E. Schick, SC
Captain	William F. Karsten, MI
Captain	John W. Zimmerman, FA
Captain	Marlin G. Heilman, AUS
1st Lt	Robert C. Carey, INF
1st Lt	Theodore Brown, INF
CWO	Virgil J. Bachman, AUS

ENLISTED MEN

M/Sgt	Paul M. Kober	Sgt	Harold L. Wooten
M/Sgt	William F. Pelzer	Sgt	Frank C. Garvey
M/Sgt	Clifford C. Lyon	Sgt	Arthur Kerdermann
T/Sgt	Ashley D. Stonestreet	Sgt	Neil D. Loynachan
T/Sgt	Herbert R. Meyer	Sgt	Anthony C. Martinello
T/Sgt	Joseph A. Gagliano	Sgt	John F. Hobson
T/Sgt	Franklin P. Branham	Sgt	Albert H. Sprague
T/Sgt	Peter H. Kaskell	Sgt	William B. Broochmann
T/Sgt	Kenneth R. Tubbs	Tec 4	George G. Robinson, Jr
S/Sgt	Thomas H. Carmitchell	Cpl	Kenneth B. Odham
S/Sgt	Eric Rosenbaum	Cpl	Frederick Alt
S/Sgt	George R. Sharp	Cpl	William E. Hall
S/Sgt	Loren C. Ozias	Cpl	Rudd M. Holt
Tec 3	Charles H. Peschke	Cpl	George A. Santarini
Sgt	William G. Yount	PFC	Hans A. Trepp
Sgt	Theophilq Vincent	PFC	Alfred Lohner

5. Included is a G-2 Section photograph, Figure 3, taken 1 June 1945 at HEIDELBERG, GERMANY, the final headquarters of 6th Army Group.



LEFT TO RIGHT

First Row

BRIG GENERAL EUGENE L. HARRISON	(No. 4)
Colonel David G. Erskine	(No. 3)
Colonel William E. Maulsby, Jr.	(No. 5)
Lt Colonel Innes Randolph	(No. 2)
Lt Colonel Andrew J. Torrielli	(No. 6)
Lt Colonel Herrick F. Bearce	(No. 1)
Lt Colonel Henry Frankel	(No. 7)

Second Row

Captain George E. Schick
 Captain Peter G. Chicos
 Captain Paul C. Lindsey
 Major William C. Hobbs, Jr.
 Major Paul C. Westerman
 Major Richard A. Montgomery
 Captain George Wolf
 Captain Sidney Reisberg
 Captain William F. Karsten

Third Row

T/Sgt Joseph A. Gagliano
 M/Sgt Clifford C. Lyon
 M/Sgt Paul M. Kober
 Lt Robert C. Carey
 Captain Marlin G. Heilman
 Lt Theodore Brown
 CWO Virgil J. Bachman
 M/Sgt William F. Pelzer
 T/Sgt Ashley D. Stonestreet
 T/Sgt Franklin P. Branham

Fourth Row

Sgt Harold L. Wooten
 Sgt Theophilo Vincent
 T/4 George G. Robinson, Jr.
 Sgt William G. Yount
 S/Sgt Loren C. Ozias
 S/Sgt George R. Sharp
 S/Sgt Eric Rosenbaum
 S/Sgt Thomas H. Carmitchell
 T/Sgt Kenneth R. Tubbs
 T/Sgt Peter H. Kaskell
 T/Sgt Herbert R. Meyer

Fifth Row

PFC Rudd M. Holt
 PFC Hans A. Trepp
 Cpl George A. Santarini
 T/5 William B. Broockmann
 Cpl William E. Hall
 Cpl Albert H. Sprague
 Cpl John F. Hobson
 Cpl Anthony C. Martinello
 Cpl Neil D. Loynachan
 Cpl Frederick Alt
 Cpl Kenneth B. Odham
 Cpl Frank C. Garvey

Personnel not shown on picture

Lt Colonel Robert N. Denniston
 Major John R. Draper
 Captain John W. Zimmerman
 Cpl Arthur Kerdemann
 PFC Alfred Iohner

CHAPTER 2OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCEFROM THE RHONE TO THE MEURTHE

When, on 15 September 1944, Headquarters 6th Army Group assumed operational control of the Seventh US Army and the First French Army, the enemy had practically completed his retreat up the Rhone. Using the LXVI Reserve Corps on the North and the armored power in LXXXV Corps on the South, the German Nineteenth Army had created a funnel through which LXIV Reserve Corps and IV GAF Corps poured their motley components. With more than 60,000 Germans abandoned in Southern France, the Nineteenth Army finally made contact with the First Army in the LUNEVILLE area, and turned to face the 6th Army Group.

On 15 September 1944, the enemy had disposed the following major units on a line running almost due south from LUNEVILLE to the Swiss border: LXVI Reserve Corps (21 Pz Div, 16 Inf Div, 111 Pz Brig, 112 Pz Brig, 113 Pz Brig); LXIV Reserve Corps (189 Inf and 716 Inf Divs); IV GAF Corps (159 Inf, 198 Inf, and 338 Inf Divs); and LXXXV Corps (11 Pz Div, 1 GAF Tng Div). Adding to these the miscellaneous battle groups into which the hastily salvaged remnants of the Southern France garrison and training units had been organized, the enemy's total strength was estimated at some 165 tanks and 53,000/61,000 men. With excellent defensive terrain available in the VOSGES, time for the construction of defenses, and a fairly large number of second rate troops now bolstered by union with the First Army to the north, the enemy could logically make only one decision. Accordingly, "Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 1, dated 25 September 1944 stated simply "On this front, the enemy shows every intention of making full use of the defensive possibilities offered by the line he now holds."

During the succeeding weeks, the enemy did just that. He moved 11 Panzer Division north to join the Fifth Panzer Army in holding the less naturally defensive NANCY-SAVERNE GAP area. He used hit and run tactics along the rest of his line to withdraw toward the prepared positions in the VOSGES. Units with counterattacking capabilities (106 Pz Brig, 15 Pz Gr Div) were brought into the front lines while the more battered divisions retired to rest and refit. By 21 October the appearance on the front of a great number of fortress battalions was accepted as an indication that the enemy considered his defensive positions sufficiently well prepared to fall back to the VOSGES. Thereby he could be expected to release his more mobile units for use in the north. As the relief of the armored units by infantry became more noticeable in the withdrawal of Fifth Panzer Army, it seemed obvious that the enemy was passing from offensive defense to a purely static defense. (WIS No. 6, 28 Oct 1944)

FROM THE MEURTHE TO THE RHINE

By this time the forces facing 6th Army Group had undergone considerable regrouping. First Army's LXXXIX Corps (361 V Gr and 553 Inf Divs) now held the LUNEVILLE area in place of Fifth Panzer Army's LVIII and XLVII Panzer Corps. LXIV Reserve Corps (21 Pz Div, 761 Inf, 16 Inf and 338 Inf Divs), IV GAF Corps (198 Inf and 269 Inf Divs) and LXXXV Corps (159 Inf Div and Brigade VON OPPEN) in addition to 1 GAF Training Division, 19th Army Security Division, 30 SS Division and some 10 Fortress Battalion comprised the major units of Nineteenth Army running southward along the VOSGES to the Swiss border. The total strength of this array was estimated at 77,000, of whom some 20,000 men were accounted combat infantry. The withdrawal of armored units dropped the total of tanks and self-propelled guns to 60, but artillery gun strength increased to 410.

By the middle of November 1944, the enemy divisions had been reduced to a dangerously low level of combat effectives. Aided by naturally defensive terrain and continuously bad weather, the enemy had maintained a coherent defense only by the rapid shift of small units to the more obviously threatened localities. As the 6th Army Group prepared to jump off on 13 November, it was obvious that the enemy considered the arrival of 708 Volksgrenadier Division insufficient to hold the line and was bringing up further reinforcements. But the combined attack of the First French Army and the Seventh US Army completely disorganized the enemy's resistance. Their swift advance toward BELFORT and STRASBOURG, annihilated two German divisions completely, and bagged more than 15,000 prisoners, including several generals and staff officers of Nineteenth Army's headquarters. There was no doubt that the enemy had been caught completely unaware and Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 10, 25 November 1944, urged continuation of the attack in the following appreciation: "The present disposition of the enemy remains chaotic. With both his flanks dangerously threatened, he cannot have any hope of reestablishing the required balance West of the Rhine. Even the commitment of one or two fresh major units could not materially change his situation, particularly if the weather permits constant air bombardment of the crossings."

With the Seventh US Army already on the Rhine, tactical cooperation between the German First and Nineteenth Armies had been interrupted. The First Army had been forced to throw in units of XIII SS Corps (11 Pz, 17 SS Pz Gr, 130 Pz Lehr, and 25 Pz Gr Divs) in order to stop the onrush of Seventh US Army. LXXXIX Corps had assumed control of the battered 361 Volksgrenadier and 553 Volksgrenadier Divisions, bringing to their aid two new divisions from Holland (245 and 256 V Gr Divs). But by 16 December 1944, several shifts had been noticed and published in the Weekly Intelligence Summaries of 9 December (No. 12) and of 16 December (No. 13).

It was above all apparent that the enemy was not retreating, but rather fighting a very aggressive delaying action on 6th Army Group's northern front. At the same time, the Nineteenth Army in the VOSGES pocket was obviously reinforcing its northern flank. Instead of withdrawing to safety across the

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Rhine where its units could have been rapidly redeployed to the north, it showed every intention of aggressive resistance. Nevertheless, the Germans were moving their stronger and more mobile formations away from the SAAR front. "IS No. 12 (9 Dec 1944) accepted the move of LVIII Panzer Corps from our front, placing it either near TRIER or in Fifth Panzer Army near KOBLENZ. 130 Panzer Lehr Division was no longer accepted on the US XV Corps front, but was identified in the German Seventh Army's rear area. A build-up of panzer strength seemed in progress. 11 Panzer Division had broken contact and was gradually moving northward, while 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division had shifted westward to its previous sector. Only 21 Panzer Division had come in to back up the entire line, and it was in a fairly weak condition. Although US Seventh Army troops had crossed the German border at WISSEMBOURG on 15 December, nothing but weak token units were being sent to swell the estimated strength of a mere 6,100 combat infantry effectives on this front. All along the 6th Army Group's northern front the enemy had been noticeably effecting an economy of forces. At a time when the rest of the Western Front was quiet enough for him to have easily released strong reinforcements for the SAAR, it seemed strange that he preferred to give up territory in order to husband his strength.

THE GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE

On 12 December 1944, at a meeting of the 6th Army Group Joint Planning Staff, G-2 stated the enemy's capability of launching a general attack across the northern sector of the Western Front. Such a capability had definitely been taken into account in planning 6th Army Group's offensive and its execution found plans already prepared for the events which followed 16 December 1944. For the moment the only capability allowed the enemy was to "hold the terrain between the Maginot and Siegfried Lines with an aggressive defense." (G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation, 21 Dec 1944). As the US Third Army turned north, the US Seventh Army spread westward to face the German First Army's XIII SS Corps (347 Inf Div, 17 SS Pz Gr Div, 257 V Gr Div, and 25 Pz Gr Div) and LXXXIX Corps (361 V Gr Div, 245 Inf Div, 21 Pz Div, 256 V Gr Div and 553 V Gr Div). The estimated number of combat infantry effectives had already jumped sharply to 15,000 when "IS No. 14 (23 Dec 1944) interpreted heavy rail movement as the arrival of further reinforcements of divisional size.

The rapid redeployment of Allied forces had succeeded in blunting the enemy offensive after a few anxious days. Von Rundstedt was forced to consider his offensive a huge spoiling attack which would have proved sufficiently successful if he could maintain the territory gained. He had to hold against the now delayed Allied counteroffensive. 6th Army Group had already been bled of its reserves and was now strung out along a much wider front with a dangerously thin line. The enemy could actually make best use of his own failing strength by attacking and pinning down 6th Army Group, perhaps even drawing away reinforcements to this front.

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The enemy's aggressive and warily defensive attitude throughout this period, coupled with his carefully observed changes in dispositions, was interpreted as an attempt to mask purposeful activity behind a relatively quiet front. On 25 December 1944 a special G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation favored the enemy capability of "Attack on the ZWELBRUCKEN-SARREBOURG axis, attempting to cut the only lines of communication supplying Seventh Army, thus compromising its position east of the SAVERNE GAP." That night, at a meeting of the Army and Corps Commanders, this position was restated, setting the date for 1 January 1945 and listing the divisions which were to spearhead the attack. These considerations were reaffirmed in another G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation on 28 December. In the meantime, the Army Group Commander had taken measures to meet the enemy attack.

Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 15, 30 December 1944, set the stage to the last detail. While the Nineteenth Army in the pocket used every opportunity to keep the initiative, the First Army had been using the time made available to it in reorganizing its worn units behind the Siegfried Line in comparative quiet. The US Seventh Army had been forced by events along the rest of the front to relinquish its offensive. Elements of nine divisions with a combat infantry strength of 13,000 and 125 tanks and self-propelled guns, were in contact. At least five divisions were known to be in reserve, with 17 SS Panzer Grenadier, 25 Panzer Grenadier and 21 Panzer Divisions having had sufficient time to have completed their refitting. 6 SS Mountain Division was identified traveling southward, and the HARDT Mountains sector of the US Seventh Army's front favored its employment exceptionally well during the actual winter weather conditions. The enemy had been quick to occupy the territory reluctantly relinquished by our forces. There was continued evidence of bridgebuilding and large scale movements directly behind the front. In fact, there could be no question but that the enemy's intentions were definitely aggressive, if only for the purpose of preventing withdrawal of Allied forces from this front to the EIFFEL sector. The entire case was summed up as follows: "Attack on the axis HOMBURG-SARREBOURG with present forces (9 divisions) augmented by an estimated 3-5 low calibre divisions is favored. The build-up in the area, the heavy rail activity, the time elapsed permitting refitting, and the total number of troops definitely make it possible. Should the enemy succeed in reaching SARREBOURG, the withdrawal of Allied forces from hard won territory between the VOSGES and the Rhine north of STRASBOURG might become necessary." On 1 January 1945 the German First Army attacked toward SARREBOURG. Six divisions were initially involved and by the end of the week the enemy had ten divisions in line (245, 256, 361, 6 SS Mtn, 257, 559, 17 SS Pz Gr, 36, 19 and 347) and three or four in immediate reserve (21 Pz, 25 Pz Gr, 172 Res, 553 V Gr). He had massed approximately 200 tanks for the effort and his initial impetus carried him to the HARDT massive on the west. But there he was stopped by our forces, previously deployed to meet exactly such an attack.

The enemy was now in a difficult position along the entire Western Front. More than ever he had to hold 6th Army Group's forces in their deadlocked position, using only the forces actually available to Army Group G. The identification of a new corps, obviously controlling the panzer forces

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lurking behind the Siegfried Line east of the HARDT Mountains, was significant enough for G-2 to publish the following warning: "That the enemy could reinforce this front with the necessary offensive power can hardly be expected when his position along the rest of the front is growing critical. Since his ultimate objective --- to pin down the Seventh Army --- can still be effected by operating against the ALSACE plain from the east by more complete use of the forces presently at his disposal, it may be expected that the continuation of the offensive will come in that area. The attempt to effect this capability will be marked by the movement of armored forces toward the east along the BITCHE-WISSEMBURG-KARLSRUHE line and an outbreak of Rhine crossings north and south of STRASBOURG, with renewed activity against the northern edge of the VOSGES pocket." (WIS No. 16, 6 Jan 45).

The correctness of this estimate was proved by the actual events which followed. However, definite corroboration exists in a captured "Wehrmacht Fuhrungs Stab/OKW order to C in C West signed KEITEL and dated 22 January 1945. It relayed the Fuhrer's orders, as follows: "In the Lower VOSGES and on the Upper Rhine the attack, the objectives of which have already been ordered, is to continue as long as there is any prospect of destroying the enemy North of the HAGUENAU-SAVERNE line or of forcing him round to the rear of the SAVERNE GAP and thereby to open the way for the establishment of a junction with Nineteenth Army on the VOSGES Ridge."

When the enemy realized that his initial effort west of the HARDT Mountains had failed, he used the week ending on 13 January 1945 to marshal his forces for a new drive. Captured orders showed his preoccupation with seizing the ALSACE plain for the morale value such a victory would achieve, in addition to the strategic necessity for keeping the US Seventh Army occupied. Only the more aggressive units, such as 17 SS Panzer Grenadier, 6 SS Mountain, and the rebuilt 36 Infantry Divisions, showed any sensitivity. His armored strength had shifted toward the HAGUENAU area and there was evidence of further troop movements to that area. When the long suspected arrival of 10 SS Panzer and 7 Parachute Divisions was finally confirmed, it was obvious that the enemy was planning further offensive action. In fact, he had already committed too much strength on the US Seventh Army front at a very critical period; he had to make it pay. The danger signals came in the identification of XXXIX Panzer Corps as the controlling headquarters in the Maginot Corner and the enemy's sudden eruption into a bridgehead north of STRASBOURG.

For this last phase of the German counter offensive, the enemy had massed a formidable force against the US Seventh Army. Von BLASKOWITZ, Commanding Army Group G, had given von OBSTFELDER's First German Army every available unit. It lined up with the following organization: LXXXII Corps (11 Pz, 416 Inf, 719 Inf, 347 Inf Divs); XIII SS Corps (19 Inf, 17 SS Pz Gr, 559 V Gr Divs); XC Corps (257 V Gr, 256 V Gr, 36 Inf, and 6 SS Mtn Divs); and LXXXIX Corps (245 Inf Div). In addition, and most significant of the enemy's determination to execute the operation successfully, the High Command

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had placed the critical Maginot Corner area under command of the formidable XXXIX Panzer Corps (25 Pz Gr, 7 Para, 10 SS Pz, and 21 Pz Divs). Including an exceptional number of assault units, there were an estimated 38,000 combat infantry effectives and almost 250 tanks and SP guns facing the US Seventh Army on 20 January 1945.

The enemy had begun his counter offensive on a desperately grandiose scale. But his losses in the ARDENNES made it still more imperative that he win back the ALSACE plain. There is absolutely no doubt that it had been the original intention to sweep down through the Siegfried Line west of the HARDT Mountains and simultaneously push north out of the VOSGES Mountains, re-establishing the continuous front of the German First and Nineteenth Armies by a junction at the SAVERNE GAP. It had been strictly a gamble, dependent to the greatest extent on the element of surprise and the ability of Army Group G to outmaneuver the 6th Army Group. There was no surprise, and von BLASKOWITZ found DEVERS completely forewarned and forearmed. Now superior military strategy in the maneuver of the opposing forces would decide the issue. At this point, the 6th Army Group received an added advantage: HIMMLER took over command of the German operation.

With the attack west of the HARDT easily contained and Allied forces turning the tables by attacking the COLMAR pocket, HIMMLER chose to throw his best troops into the attempt to capture STRASBOURG. The campaign in this area had definitely assumed an extra-military tinge: the number of SS units committed, the organization of the command, and the purely political objective made it clear that the Nazi Party was fighting as much for its own prestige as for a military victory. It was apparent that the fight would be tenacious and determined. The week ending 20 January was marked by an intense enemy effort as he utilized tanks and flamethrowers in house to house fighting along the whole length of the Maginot Corner, while resisting sharply on the rest of the front. He succeeded in establishing a firm bridgehead across the Rhine north of STRASBOURG; now he had to consolidate his position by seizing the Moder River line through HAGUENAU. With his forces in such a position, he would have been ready to make the final attempt against STRASBOURG. He needed only a little time for reorganization; any mistake by 6th Army Group would offer him the opportunity.

6th Army Group was actually in this difficult position when a most disturbing item of intelligence was received. Tension along the entire Western Front mounted steadily. The Army Group Commander was faced with the necessity of making momentary redeployment of his dwindling available forces while SHAEF kept calling for further reserves. But there were no reserves, for the offensive against the COLMAR pocket had already drained the XXI Corps from the US Seventh Army. Should the enemy suddenly reinforce, the balance of strength would have become extremely delicate and the 6th Army Group would have been forced to go completely on the defensive, even giving up territory to maintain the integrity of its forces. But the Allied effort to regain the initiative along the Western Front was at stake; the perennially offensive spirit of the 6th Army Group had to be maintained. The critical

R E S T R I C T E D

point was reached when a supposedly unshakeable captured document, in addition to further substantiating evidence from impeccable sources, was produced by SHAEF. The purport of all the evidence submitted was ominous: the II SS Panzer Corps (2 SS and 9 SS Pz Divs) had been ordered to the 6th Army Group front.

By 25 January the German attack had been completely launched. From the Rhine and south toward HAGUENAU, every German unit was in action. The Army Group Commander accepted G-2's estimate of the situation --- that this was the final enemy effort and that the II SS Panzer Corps would not arrive in the battle --- and made his dispositions accordingly. By the night of 26 January, after the enemy had initially succeeded in crossing the Moder River and then had been immediately repulsed, the issue was no longer in doubt. The German counter offensive was over. The enemy had achieved no success worthy of his announced intentions or of the units delegated for the operation. He had shown an indecision in his military strategy, which, correctly interpreted and easily forestalled, had robbed him of all the advantages of the attacking force. Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 19, 27 January 1945, summed it up in one sentence: "In sum, the enemy has lost the initiative." The high cost of his operations, the inability to use armored formations efficiently under actual terrain and weather conditions, definite indications of their withdrawal, the preparation of defensive positions with a subsequent economy of forces and the lack of contact for some days all combined to permit the enemy a sole capability on 27 January. From the Moselle to the Rhine, he could only attempt to stabilize the front, withdrawing if necessary to successive positions along the Moder River, the Maginot Line, and the Siegfried Line.

REDUCTION OF THE COLMAR POCKET

While the US Seventh Army was preparing to assume the offensive to pierce the Siegfried Line in the SAAR-PALATINATE, the First French Army began its attack to eliminate the COLMAR pocket.

The pocket was the result of the enemy's failure to deny the 6th Army Group access to the Rhine through the BELFORT GAP in the South and the SAVERNE GAP in the North. After their arrival at the fringes of the VOSGES from LUNEVILLE to the Swiss border late in October, the Germans had spent the ensuing weeks regrouping for a continuation of the Allied offensive. Their low grade infantry replacements, hastily organized into regimental units under known divisional staffs for closer control, had taken over the area previously held by mobile forces when the latter had moved north. By 18 November the enemy's situation in the VOSGES had deteriorated to such a degree that several of the divisions were forced to withdraw in order to restore their effective fighting strength. They had been replaced by one new divisional formation and several smaller units, but it was apparent that further substantial reinforcements were necessary to reestablish a balanced line. However, the rate of attrition continued to exceed the influx of replacements.

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In the meantime, on 13 November 1944, the First French Army had begun its drive to the Rhine. The launching of the attack had been delayed for several days due to misunderstandings between the staffs of the Army Group and the Army on the point of enemy strength. The French had argued that a figure of 64,000 Germans, plus a decided advantage in naturally defensive terrain, would permit the Germans to maintain the historic impregnability of the BELFORT GAP. On the contrary, 6th Army Group estimated enemy strength at less than 16,000 combat infantry effectives, a total which actually made them numerically inferior to the French in the ratio of 2 to 1. The Army Group Commander ordered the attack to be launched and the accuracy of the estimates was sufficiently proved by ensuing events.

It was well known how much importance the enemy had attached to guarding the BELFORT GAP. The terrain defenses surrounding the citadel had been completely developed and entrusted to the defense of three divisions (338 V Gr, 189 V Gr, and 159 V Gr Divs) under LXXXV Corps. Our initial attacks found the enemy yielding ground very grudgingly and exercising a harsh scorched earth policy, burning such towns as LE THOLY and GERARDMER to the ground. But it was soon evident that sufficient reserves were not available. No new units were identified and five of the nine divisions in the area made forced marches southward to reestablish a defensive position along the Rhone-Rhine canal. The initial impetus of two of these divisions actually carried them to the Swiss border near DELLE, cutting the French lines of communications for a short period, but the situation was immediately restored. The French regained the advantage, took MULHOUSE and drove to the Rhine. In the meantime, the US Seventh Army had collapsed the German Nineteenth Army's northern flank in the SAVERNE GAP and captured STRASBOURG on 23 November 1944. The Nineteenth Army was now isolated west of the Rhine and the COLMAR pocket had taken shape.

However, although the enemy's time table had been disarranged by the 6th Army Group's success, it had been part of his overall strategy in planning the ARDENNES offensive to maintain a strong threat in ALSACE. During the last week in November he stabilized his two dangerously exposed flanks by determined rear guard actions in the extremely bad winter weather of the VOSGES. Tired and depleted units were shifted to more immediately threatened areas on the enemy's interior lines of communication and they performed excellently. Without the despatch of additional major units, he finally succeeded in establishing a continuous line along the slopes of the mountains.

Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 13, 16 December 1944, appreciated the German Nineteenth Army's determination to remain west of the Rhine. The statements of prisoners of war who spoke of orders to fight to the death backed by the guns of SS troopers were confirmed by observation of the enemy's activities. In spite of the loss of the bridgehead at KEMBS after fanatic resistance, the enemy showed no tendency to preserve manpower by yielding ground. On the contrary, a substantial increase in the fortifications protecting the important Rhine crossings was noted with exceptional attention.

being paid to the strategic NEUF BRISACH road and rail bridge. That the army was able successfully to defend its positions during December with a minimum number of replacements was due primarily to excellent tactical use of the swollen stream lines in the area. Aid in defense was also gained by the possession of the high ridges to the north of COLMAR and south of a line CERNAY-THANN. The availability of interior lines of communications permitted the Germans to maneuver available units rapidly in order to create a relative parity of forces in critical sectors, although greatly outnumbered along the entire sector of defense. Artillery fire from the east bank of the Rhine River was brought to bear on friendly Allied elements operating in the COLMAR area and to the North. These favorable conditions were coupled with an aggressive spirit which continually hit out at Allied troops in order to keep them off balance.

Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 15, 30 December 1944, pointed out that the Nineteenth German Army was using every opportunity to keep the initiative. There was no doubt that the First German Army was about to launch an attack against the US Seventh Army in the north. At the very least, the enemy had to maintain the threat of an attack northward out of the pocket. Should the First Army reach the SAVERNE GAP, the possibility of reestablishing a continuous front to the Swiss border would have been actually within the enemy's capability.

The failure to achieve success in the drive along the HOMBURG-SARREBOURG axis on 1 January 1945 nevertheless left two objectives of prime importance for the enemy's attack: the capture of SAVERNE and STRASBOURG would have still been strategic victories for the maintenance of ALSACE as German territory. To further this line of action, crossings of the Rhine north and south of STRASBOURG seemed imminent, as well as continuation of the activity in the northern edge of the COLMAR pocket. The build-up in the pocket itself became very noticeable during the first days of the New Year, when elements of 269 Infantry, 708 Volksgrenadier, 198 Volksgrenadier Divisions began to concentrate in the MUNSTER-COLMAR-SELESTAT area. By such a disposition of forces, the enemy could simultaneously effect two purposes. On the one hand, he could give firmer protection to COLMAR, key city of the pocket. At the same time, he prepared for the mounting of a limited offensive in conjunction with the main effort in the SAAR-HARDT area. The arrival of some six replacement battalions was indicative of the enemy's intention to wage at least a very aggressive defense.

The numerous small scale attacks mounted by the enemy were widely scattered and were intended only to hold the Allied forces off balance. These intentions were later confirmed by captured officers who stated their mission had been merely to improve the defensive positions and to establish a main line of resistance on the Ill River. The increase in armor was substantiated by the rebuilt power of 106 Panzer Brigade and the identification of organic tanks with the infantry type divisions in their sorties toward STRASBOURG. Eight divisions were still in contact on 13 January 1945, as the enemy seemed determined to hold. However, although enemy strength had been maintained in

spite of losses during the small actions in the pocket, the strategic threat to the Allies had been completely alleviated as a result of the overall German Army situation and the difficulty of the terrain in this sector.

The intentions of the enemy to remain in the COLMAR pocket were conditioned by two main factors: (1) by holding the COLMAR pocket the enemy was immobilizing a substantial portion of our forces which otherwise could be used on other vital sectors of the front; (2) the enemy's efforts to break through the WISSEMBOURG GAP could be substantially supported by offensive operations from the COLMAR pocket, thus threatening the eastern flanks of Seventh Army and our lines of communications south of the SAVERNE GAP. To accomplish the mission of holding the pocket it was stated, in G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation in the COLMAR POCKET, dated 18 January, that a minimum of 17,000-20,000 combat effectives would be required. The low calibre of troops identified in the pocket was sufficiently compensated by the excellent defensive terrain at their disposal. But the enemy was limited merely to strong defensive actions because of an obvious lack of depth. Sufficient reserves were not available to maintain the crust-like defenses against determined Allied offensive actions.

On 20 January 1945, the First French Army launched its attack for the final elimination of this German thorn in the flank of Allied troops. The enemy disposed of eight divisions plus an armored brigade at this time with 17,000 combat infantry effectives supported by some 250 artillery pieces and 70-100 tanks or SP guns. The higher formations from South to North were as follows: LXIII Corps (716 V Gr, 159 V Gr, and 338 V Gr Divs) and LXIV Corps (16 V Gr, 708 V Gr, 189 V Gr, 269 V Gr, 106 Pz Brig, and 198 V Gr Divs). The heaviest concentration of German men and material was disposed for the defense of COLMAR and to the north as far as RHINAU.

The enemy was surprised by the initial assaults toward COLMAR from the MULHOUSE-THANN area. He resisted fiercely with the 159 Volksgrenadier and 716 Volksgrenadier Divisions actually disposed in the area. However, the Allied attack was not pushed with sufficient vigor during the hours of darkness and the enemy reacted with extreme vigor. Employing local reserves and utilizing interior lines of communications, he brought forward elements of 106 Panzer Brigade and 2 Mountain Division, the recently arrived replacement for 269 Volksgrenadier Division. This counterattack, supported by Jagd-Panthers and Royal Tiger Tanks and vigorously prosecuted, stopped the friendly forces and even regained some points. However, this was accomplished only at the cost of heavy losses in men and equipment; due to the poor caliber and lack of sufficient numbers of troops it could not be sustained. The enemy was unable to regain the initiative and after a day or so resorted to slow withdrawals. His main objective then became to prevent the encirclement of his forces west of the Rhine River. Throughout the week continuously bad weather hampered operations in this area.

The French drive from the south was coordinated with an attack to follow three days later by the XXI US Corps, directed on the city of COLMAR from the

north. The French attack had succeeded in withdrawing some elements to the south. However, the enemy brought in the rest of 2 Mountain Division and shifted 708 Volksgrenadier Division towards the point of main effort from the north. Aided by bad weather and lack of cover for advancing troops on the ALSACE Plain, exacted a heavy Allied price and yielded only a limited amount of territory.

The commitment of XXI US Corps constituted the entire 6th Army Group reserve. It was done with the intention of speeding up the reduction of the pocket. However, due to tenacious enemy resistance and the arrival of many new Royal Tiger Tanks the situation became rather strained.

During the early part of the week ending 3 February 1945, the enemy offered bitter opposition and armored counterattacks to all attempts by XXI US Corps to advance. However, after the capture of HORBURG, northeast of COLMAR, enemy resistance began to crumble and a general withdrawal towards NEUF BRISACH was noted. Meanwhile the French continued to make some progress against stiffening resistance and captured the town of CERNAY. The German troop disposition remained basically the same. LXIV Corps was ordered to hold COLMAR and a bridgehead at NEUF BRISACH at all cost, while LXIII Corps was ordered to extricate itself whenever the integrity of its forces were threatened. The end of the week witnessed the fall of COLMAR and the beginning of the hasty retreat of Nineteenth Army over the Rhine. Its headquarters were already moved to BADENWEILER.

The fate of Nineteenth Army had been sealed. Its losses amounted to approximately forty per cent of the initial combat effectives plus all reinforcements. This totaled more than 10,000 combat infantry effectives. 708 Volksgrenadier Division had already fallen back across the river, while 16, 189, and 198 Volksgrenadier Divisions were beginning to lose organic cohesion. 2 Mountain Division could do no more than fight a delaying action North of MULHOUSE the few remaining troops of 716, 159, and 338 Volksgrenadier Divisions were battling to keep the southern shoulder of the pocket firm. The enemy could claim two worthless successes: (1) prevention of the encirclement of his troops on the left bank of the Rhine; and (2) a delay of about 10 days enforced upon the 6th Army Group time schedule. By 3 February 1945 the enemy was restricted to choosing between the Rhine and destruction.

The destruction of the Nineteenth German Army was completed at 0800A Hours, 8 February 1945. 22,000 permanent casualties were suffered, as well as 55 armored vehicles and 66 artillery pieces counted destroyed or captured. The final phase of the operation was climaxed by the enemy failure to hold the NEUF BRISACH area, which protected his escape route over the Rhine. The junction of friendly forces from north and south at ROUFFACH had resulted in the isolation of 1,000 German troops. Thus on 7 February 1945 only the NEUNBURG bridge remained to the enemy for evacuation of the few remnants remaining west of the river. Only an estimated 3/4,000 combat infantry effectives were saved from the initial complement of 17,000 located in the

pocket. These available forces could form cadres for two or three weak divisions, which in turn could be committed elsewhere on the front only after a short rest period.

BREACHING THE SIEGFRIED LINE

The 6th Army Group was not content to permit Army Group G to retire to defensive positions, however. An offensive against the enemy was definitely indicated and that meant intense effort by G-2 to produce the correct estimate of the enemy situation.

By 3 February 1945, the enemy was completely on the defensive along the entire 6th Army Group front. His offensive power had been met and eliminated in large part. As he sought the protection of prepared defensive positions, there was a withdrawal of several units and a concomitant realignment of responsibilities. The failure of HIMMLER's politico-military campaign in ALSACE threw the burden back on Army Group G, particularly since XXXIX Panzer Corps withdrew from the area with its three major units (25 Pz Gr, 21 Pz, and 7 Para Divs). From the west the corps now were aligned as follows: LXXXII Infantry (11 Pz, 416 Inf, 719 Inf and 347 Inf Divs); XIII SS (19 Inf, 17 SS Pz Gr, and 559 V Gr Divs); XC Infantry (257 V Gr, 6 SS Mtn, and 36 Inf Divs); and LXXXIX Infantry (246 Inf, 47 Inf, and 10 SS Pz Divs). Similarly, XIV SS and XVIII SS Corps across the Rhine had returned to a purely administrative defence command status on the cessation of offensive action by the enemy. The US Seventh Army was facing an estimated 25,000 combat infantry effectives with less than 100 tanks and SP guns by this time. In the VOSGES area, the orderly disengagement of the German Nineteenth Army was already beginning to show signs of hasty retreat.

During the subsequent weeks, while 6th Army Group mounted its offensive, G-2 carefully followed the enemy's frantic attempts to rebuild his destroyed divisions. The exigencies of other fronts forced Army Group G continuously to regroup its forces. There was much movement of division symbols across the war room maps. SS General HAUSSER, who had replaced von BLASKOWITZ in command of Army Group G, had but one mission from the Swiss border to the Moselle: to provide the mobile forces necessary to maintain the integrity of the Siegfried positional defenses. His immediate concern was the creation of mobile reserves. The lengths to which he was forced in order to meet the situation were indicative of the waning power of the Germans. By reorganizing two-regiment divisions on a three regiment/two battalion basis, the line divisions created sector reserves by thinning out the total number of units in contact. In addition, the recently assigned 14 SP guns of the divisional anti-tank battalions were used in conjunction with GHQ mobile formations for shock action against attempted penetrations of the defenses. But even this tactical redeployment did not materially increase the enemy's overall defensive capability.

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As 6th Army Group's left flank began to move forward against the Siegfried Line in the FORBACH area, the measures to which the enemy resorted in maintaining his lines unbroken strengthened the belief that he had no alternative. In the MOSELLE-SAAR triangle he had sacrificed sacred German soil; at FORBACH the Volkssturm had been left to fight alone. With the Siegfried Line the front line from SAARBURG to SAARBRUCKEN, the German First Army was desperately striving with no reserves to meet a situation in which the initiative was entirely in the hands of 6th Army Group. As for the defeated German Nineteenth Army across the Rhine, it no sooner rehabilitated a division than it was snatched away to stop another gap on the SAAR-PALATINATE front.

By 3 March the enemy was maintaining a shallow line against the 6th Army Group only by extensive manipulation of his dwindling forces. In spite of the obvious difficulties in which Army Group G found itself, it could muster less than an estimated 20,000 combat infantry effectives and 225 tanks and SP guns to man its natural river line and positional defenses. First Army's plight was indicated by the reappearance of such divisions as 49 and 16 Volksgrenadier, each of which was nothing more than a divisional staff serving to give some tactical organization to the scattered battle groups and Volkssturm units under command. The mountain divisions (2 Mtn and 6 SS Mtn) moved back and forth along the front in an attempt to seal each minor penetration. Although the overall strength of the enemy rose slightly, particularly in number of divisional formations, the fighting efficiency of the enemy dropped steadily as his combat infantry effectives were slowly cut down and his replacements failed to appear. The enemy definitely failed to appreciate 6th Army Group's offensive intentions and continued to give this front so low a priority that Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 24, 3 March 1945, could permit the enemy only one capability: "Army Group G can still attempt to defend itself. In the execution of this endeavor it may elect to be destroyed along its present position or to maintain the integrity of its organization by falling back to the Rhine. The selection of the lesser evil is the only capability which remains."

As the day for the initiation of 6th Army Group's offensive drew closer, the Army Group Commander requested an overall study of the entire front. The purpose of the paper was to permit planning of the final phases of the campaign for the destruction of the German Army. On 5 March 1945, the G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation as of 1 May was presented and accepted. The conclusions were succinctly stated as follows: "The situation as of 1 May for the German Army will have so deteriorated that the forces available on any one front will not be available for diversion except as a temporary measure. The German Nation on 1 May will be unable to sustain its present forces. The Army will gradually degenerate in strength and quality. Destruction of enemy forces on our front will not be replaceable in their entirety after 1 May beyond the commitment of one or two divisions from the High Command Reserve." Further declarations, substantially the same as the preceding, marked our estimates of the enemy situation continually. Accordingly, the attacks of our troops began and continued with sustained confidence.

When the German forces on the EIFFEL front collapsed, Army Group G was left as the only higher headquarters with units still west of the Rhine. Its strategic defensive position was seriously jeopardized by the retreat of the German Seventh Army on its right flank. The Siegfried positions being held by the German First Army were fast becoming a liability as the threat of a crossing on the Moselle grew, due to the necessary immobility of the fortress troops. On the other hand, the two positions --- along the Moselle and the Siegfried line to the Rhine --- were necessarily interdependent. Penetration of the one would leave the forces on the other in immediate danger of attack from the rear, if not of complete encirclement. To guard against such an eventuality, the enemy would have to consider the saving of his troops the controlling factor, outweighing even the protection of the SAAR-PALATINATE.

The enemy was thus in an extremely precarious position, complicated by his own indecision and forced reliance on make-shifts, when 6th Army Group launched its offensive on 15 March. Army Group G disposed of some twenty-five divisional formations on that date. But this formidable number of divisional symbols could not actually be accounted as better than 30,000 combat infantry effectives, 950 artillery pieces, and 200 tanks and SP guns. It is certain that the Allied attack achieved complete tactical surprise. With the German Seventh Army trying to cut off the Allied penetration to BINGEN and BAD KREUZNACH, its mission to cover the right flank of the German First Army was already beyond hope of fulfillment. To climax the enemy's weakness, just as the US Seventh Army jumped off three enemy divisions (198 Inf, 559 Inf and 6 SS Mtn) were moved away from the points of attack. The secondary Allied attack in the HAGUENAU area met the expected stiff resistance, but pushed forward sufficiently to cause the enemy to divert troops to that area. Accordingly, the main effort up the valley of the Blies River on 15 March found only light to moderate resistance and the enemy anxious to seek the safety of the Siegfried Line. By noon of 17 March enemy opposition was apparently disintegrating and the outer defenses of the Siegfried Line had already been penetrated. General HAUSSER had to keep open the road net from KAISERSLAUTERN to the Rhine as a final avenue of escape. There was already no doubt that he would be driven across the Rhine; he could decide only how many Germans he wished to leave captive west of the river.

By 25 March, the 6th Army Group's front line was the Rhine.

CROSSING THE RHINE

Army Group G's completely overwhelming defeat in the SAAR-PALATINATE had reduced it to merely an expression. The beaten enemy had left west of the Rhine more than 75 percent of his combat effectives and approximately 50 percent of the total military personnel deployed in the area prior to the Allied attack. The total prisoners of war alone amounted to 114,000. His losses in tanks, guns and necessary supplies had been at a proportionate level. His morale was shattered. A successful Allied crossing of the river north of GERNESHEIM quickly negated the German First Army's mission to maintain the watch on the Rhine. The collapse of its right flank had immediately not

only caused the destruction of the German Seventh Army to the north, but also allowed the Siegfried Line to be turned and rolled up from the rear. Under its new commander, Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH, the former Chief of Staff of Army Group F in the Balkans, the First Army was merely a shell with no hope of effective reinforcements. From the Nineteenth Army to the south it could expect only limited aid in the form of static forces which might hold sufficiently long to permit some reorganization. But any delay in attacking the enemy across the Rhine would have militated against the completeness of the Allied victory. The enemy was restricted to attempting, and without the slightest confidence in eventual success, to delay the final surrender.

The weakness of Army Group G proved fatal to the entire German Wehrmacht on the Western Front. By its failure to guard the FRANKFURT-ASCHAFFENBURG gateway to the KASSEL corridor, Army Group B's flank had been exposed; it ended with its subsequent encirclement and destruction. General HAUSSER was now left alone to defend the approaches to NURENBERG and MUNICH with forces already too thin for their 200 mile front. He was in need of strong panzer forces to blunt our own armored thrusts in order to make positional warfare even a temporarily successful possibility. But unless some could be transferred from the Eastern Front, there were none to be had. Nor, in the opinion of G-2, could Nineteenth Army in the South effectively produce the necessary balanced formations from its battered remnants to establish any sort of defensive line. The only opposition could come from static garrisons whose own immobility had left them in the path of advancing Allied forces. There was only one move the enemy could make: to withdraw into the interior of Germany. By 15 April he was well on his way.

REDUCTION OF THE GERMAN NATIONAL REDOUBT

In the meantime, the existence of an alleged National Redoubt had come into prominence. From agents, from secret sources and from the international press came unending reports on the preparation of a last great defensive position in the mountain fastnesses of Austria. Once the legend had become established, every scrap of information gathered was interpreted as further confirmation. Intelligence officers in the whole Allied Armed Forces produced excellently documented studies, with photographs and detailed plans. But 6th Army Group G-2, in whose territory the area lay, could not ignore an extremely significant fact. Whereas the unanimity on specific detail extended even to German radio propaganda and Swiss newspapers, German prisoners of war had never heard of the National Redoubt, translate it as we would. A single captured document had mentioned a project for such a plan which had been discontinued early in January 1945. As far as 6th Army Group was concerned, the decision was expressed in Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 28, 31 March: "The turn of military events is effectively destroying the National Redoubt for want of both territory and personnel. Any retreat into the mountains of southeastern Germany will hardly be voluntary on the part of the German leaders. In fact, this projected ultimate concentration area is much more likely to terminate as a concentration camp area."

By the middle of April it was estimated that the enemy could muster against the 6th Army Group front less than 30,000 combat infantry effectives, 51 artillery battalions, and 190 tanks and SP guns. He was about to be separated from the German armies in the north by the junction of American and Soviet forces near DRESDEN. His position was actually strongest in the south, where he might retreat concentrically behind natural terrain barriers from all his fronts simultaneously. As long as he could control the rate of withdrawal, he was in a position to maintain a cohesive front line whose strength could actually increase for a period as its perimeter contracted. A National Redoubt was in fact being created as a result of the Allied drive from all fronts. But this eventuality, whether planned or fortuitous, was obvious and the countermeasure was urged: to pierce the front deeply and simultaneously at several points.

The initial deep penetration was made in the SCHWABISCH HALL area and Lieutenant General SCHULZ, new commander of Army Group G, found himself fighting a battle from strongpoints which were quickly isolated. He had to guard the approaches to strategic areas in the South, preventing him from fighting the war of maneuver which would have been his only strategy. No amount of rapid deployment of his few mobile units could have been --- and was not --- sufficient to hold a cohesive line. The US Seventh Army and the French First Army simply continued to chop up his forces, encircling them as quickly as they stopped to resist. Between 21 and 26 April, the enemy lost 78,650 troops as prisoners of war alone. The German Nineteenth Army, merely a number of isolated pockets by 28 April, was defeated and ready for capitulation. The German First Army was likewise practically isolated and was trying to fight an independent action with exposed flanks for the defense of MUNICH. It was apparent that capitulation was imminent. He had only the alternative of senseless immolation, fighting hopelessly from isolated strongpoints as his lines disintegrated. On 28 April 1945, G-2 stated flatly: "The enemy is militarily completely defeated; he will be allowed neither respite nor truce, choose whichever one he will."

One week later, Army Group G comprising Nineteenth and First German Armies surrendered unconditionally to 6th Army Group, with effect from 1200B Hours, 6 May 1945. In that week First Army had yielded more than 200,000 prisoners of war. It had so completely lost organic cohesion that the enemy commanders who surrendered were not cognizant of their own order of battle. Only three divisions (38 SS, 407 Mob, and 17 SS), with a total of 7,000 effectives, were still capable of temporary organized resistance. Not a single Nineteenth Army division was capable of effective defensive action.

Actually, the military defeat of Army Group G had been accomplished in the 6th Army Group's drive through the SAAR-PALATINATE and across the Rhine. After the initial rout of the German First Army by the US Seventh Army, the enemy was never again able to present a cohesive front. Finally, the failure to prepare defenses and the scanty forces left to hold the approaches into the mountains of western Austria clearly indicated that the

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formation of a recoubt area had been at best merely a belated plan, meant to have been a haven for a selected few rather than a part of the overall German military strategy.

On one point there can be no doubt. As it was along the entire front, so in the zone of the 6th Army Group, the German Wehrmacht was in - contestably defeated on the battlefield.

R E S T R I C T E D

Chapter 3

COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

Organization of the Counter-Intelligence Section.

At the time of the formation of the Sixth Army Group Headquarters it was difficult to predict just what problems would confront the Counter-Intelligence Section of the G-2 Section when the headquarters should become functional. It was appreciated that as time wore on there would be many changes to be made and, with this in mind, flexibility became the keystone of the initial and subsequent organizations. The changes that have been made in the set up of the Counter-Intelligence Section since its original formation have proven the necessity for maintaining flexibility.

The Counter-Intelligence Section was first organized in Bastia, August 1944, and was divided into two sub-sections; Counter-Intelligence (Military) and Counter-Intelligence (Civilian). (Figure 4) On becoming operational in France it was soon discovered that it was hard to divide the problems which arose according to these categories as most of them overlapped and contained both civil and military aspects. Accordingly the section was reorganized in October at Vittel and divided into three sub-sections.

The first of these sub-sections, the Executive, comprised two officers (one Major and one Captain) and three enlisted men. Their functions were to handle all clerical work, filing, preparation of routine reports and normal routine correspondence.

The second sub-section, which was called "Operations", composed of two officers (one Lieutenant Colonel and one Major) worked directly with the Section Chief. All clerical work for this sub-section was done by the Executive sub-section.

At this time the card index of wanted personalities arrived from SHAEF and as there was a large task to be done setting these cards up in a usable form, a third, or Personalities sub-section, was organized which comprised one officer (Captain) and two enlisted clerks. This sub-section dealt solely with the personality cards and carried out its own clerical work. Its organization and functions remained the same from then until June 1945 when the cards were shipped to AFHQ.



Near the end of October the task of selecting, locating, and organizing Counter-Intelligence targets in Germany began to appear and an officer (Major) in the Operations sub-section was assigned to this work with such aid as he needed from the clerks-typists in the Executive sub-section. He devoted all of his energies to this target task and, as it was separate from the work of the rest of the Section, it was referred to as the Target sub-section.

ORGANIZATION OF COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SECTION

G-2 SECTION, Hqs. SIXTH ARMY GROUP

August-September 1944

BASTIA - LYON



18 November 1944

VITTEL, FRANCE




FIGURE 4

In February the target work was practically completed and ready to be turned over to the Armies. At the time there was a great deal of work to be done on ECLIPSE planning and the Target sub-section became the Plans sub-section.

In the meantime all problems of security, frontier, boundary and travel control, coordination of Civil Censorship, the Securite' Militaire, the C.I.C. and S.C.I. were being handled by the Section Chief and the officer (Lieutenant Colonel) remaining in the Operations sub-section.

In April when the headquarters followed the Armies into Germany the problems of frontier, boundary and travel control became one of great importance and size, therefore a Captain was added to the Section to take over this function.

As the day of surrender approached it was anticipated that this headquarters might take over occupational functions. With this in mind a plan was drawn up for the reorganization of the Counter-Intelligence Section. As it was based on previous experience and indicates what problems must be dealt with, a chart of this reorganization is included herewith. (Figure 5).

Throughout the entire campaign the special Counter-Intelligence agencies, S.C.I., C.I.C., Civil Censorship and the French Securite' Militaire that worked with the Section reported directly to the Chief of the Section and worked in close cooperation with the various sub-sections.

Operation of the Counter-Intelligence Section.

Counter Intelligence activities of the Armies had as their mission four basic objectives. These were the prevention of espionage, sabotage and subversion on the part of the enemy and, lastly, the security of the command in regard to leakage of information, as well as the safety of installations and headquarters in all echelons. The policies and directives given them by this headquarters, which were designed to successfully accomplish these four objectives, resulted in the physical accomplishment of measures which, in themselves, brought about the successful completion of the Counter Intelligence mission assigned the Army Groups. In our own Army Group the particular problems which confronted us took the form of the efforts on the part of the enemy to penetrate our front lines by means of line crossers. This, coupled with the use of stay-behind agents using radio sets for communication, and stay-behind agents endeavoring to form an espionage net behind our lines, comprised the major effort of the German Intelligence Service. When line crossing became too difficult the enemy resorted to dropping agents by means of parachutes and even to flying them to Spain and sending them into France across the frontier. It should be pointed out here that the methods used by the GIS to obtain their information from agents or spies was based on the principal of numbers rather than quality. In other




FIGURE 5

words, if they sent through the lines 100 agents and 10 of these returned, having accomplished their mission, the GIS looked upon this effort as successful. Thus, there was such a flood of spies continually endeavoring to get through our lines to the rear area and obtain information as to troop concentrations, installations, etc., and get back to their base that it was essential for us to pay strict attention to the establishment of road blocks and check points along the main arteries of communication in order to pick up as many of these people as possible. Furthermore, it was necessary to continually indoctrinate troops with the need for care and caution when coming in contact with dubious personalities. Furthermore, the Counter-Intelligence agencies set up in rear of the Armies in the form of CIC and SCI Detachments had a job cut out for them in their search for stay-behind agents with radio sets as well as those designed to set up and operate espionage rings behind our lines. Thus, we can see that the Counter Intelligence problem which confronted the Army Groups was not an easy one.

No fixed or fast rules could be laid down as to how or when the GIS would be successfully combatted. It required a constant vigilance on the part of all concerned to prevent the enemy from obtaining needed information by means of the intelligence agencies described above. This plus the constant effort to impress and maintain security within our own headquarters and installations gave Counter Intelligence unique problems to solve. From the interrogation of enemy prisoners, particularly the officers, it was learned that a great deal of information which the Germans obtained was gained through the carelessness of our own people. For some unknown reason officers would carry on their person documents outlining completely all troop units of the Seventh Army. Again, others would engage strangers in conversation and explain in detail what they knew about plans for future operations. Such measures were combatted in the Armies by means of security lectures and continual cautions were necessary to keep the subject alive. Hence, it could be seen that it was necessary for Counter Intelligence to attack their numerous problems from many angles if success in combatting the efforts of the enemy to obtain vital information was to be attained.


In the operations which began with the landing in Southern France, the first major success in the field led to the uncovering of an espionage ring in the area of Bourg and Dijon with the subsequent arrest of twenty-one agents. During the latter part of October and the early part of November, particular attention was paid to the establishment of an adequate system for controlling the movement of civilians within the area of the Army Group and coordinating the locations of check points and patrols on our left flank with those of the 12th Army Group. As a result of this improved system numerous Abwehr suspects, members of the Milice, etc., were picked up. At about this same time penetration agents began to be active, some of whom made an attempt to disguise themselves as friendly FFI. Evidence of this activity is

indicated when it is noted that during the month of October the following listed members of the German Intelligence Service were apprehended:

W/T agents	4
Stay behind agents	20
Line passers	2
Total	<u>26</u>

Materially assisting in the apprehension of the spies of the German Intelligence Service was the intricate system of traffic controls and road blocks established by the First French Army and the Seventh Army. The Seventh Army control system eventually reached a total of 225 posts established in Army, Corps and Division areas. These posts were manned by two or more Gendarmes or MPs and were set up at strategic points on the communication network of roads. Corps CIC Detachments located themselves centrally with respect to their own road blocks and control posts. They would closely check and supervise the work. This system, of course, was maintained for a 24 hour period daily. So successful were the measures employed by these road blocks and check points that captured GIS agents stated that they were instructed to avoid crossing the lines in the American sector of the Seventh Army because of the extensive control network in operation there. In addition to the above features roving patrols were set up in each corps. During the period 15 December 1944 to 1 January 1945 the VI Corps operated 64 miles of MP Road Control and the XV Corps had 80 miles in their area. Again, during the period 1 January 1945 to 15 January 1945 the roving patrols in the VI Corps covered a route totalling 145 miles in length. In addition, a uniform type of civilian pass as well as a curfew pass was put into effect in the Corps areas and no other passes were honored.

In the area of the First French Army traffic control posts totalled approximately 128. The average number of espionage agents apprehended from D-Day until 31 December averaged .6 a day for Seventh Army with the First French Army closely paralleling this figure. The activity of the road blocks is evidenced by the fact that during the month of February these installations screened a total of 10,623 persons of whom 292 were found to be travelling illegally or to be suspect enemy agents. For the month of January the arrests tapered off to an average of .4 a day and from then until the invasion of Germany the activity of the GIS was at a minimum. It is interesting to note that the highest number of agents apprehended in any one period was 19 for the first two weeks in December in the area of the Seventh Army. This is in striking contrast to a low of none for the last two weeks in February by the same Army, showing to what extent the efforts of the German Intelligence Service dropped off, as the end of the war drew nearer. (See attached graph, Figure 6). In this connection it is to be noted that in the period extending from the initial landing in Southern France until the invasion of Southern Germany began, the Counter-Intelligence agencies of the 6th Army Group apprehended 196 enemy agents including line



PERIODS COVERED

FIGURE 6

crossers, W/T operators, stay behind agents and parachutists.

Security of information was always prominent in the foreground of our activities. By this is meant the prevention of information we possess from unwittingly falling into the hands of the enemy by carelessness on the part of our own people. Continuous schedules of Security Lectures to the troops, frequent check of installations by CIC to insure proper guarding and necessary control measures, was a 24 hour job. Even so, much valuable information was obtained by the enemy through captured documents, monitoring of our radio nets and by means of the interrogation of our soldiers, who, in many cases, proved only too willing to talk. However, the efforts on our part were not altogether unsuccessful as evident by an enemy situation map found in the vacated headquarters of the German LXIV Corps in Strasbourg. This gave the situation as they knew it on 19-20 November 1944 with the following notable errors.

	<u>Actual Location</u>	<u>Location on Map</u>
CP Sixth Army Group	Vittel (Z6758)	Fedry (O6696)
CP Seventh Army	Epinal (VO454)	Monthureux (J7243)
CP First French Army	Besancon (O7856)	Vesoul (O8798)
CP VI Corps	Grandvillers (V2161)	Thaon-Les Vosges (VO362)
CP XV Corps	Luneville (VO899)	Charmois Area (VO195)

Two newly arrived US Divisions of Seventh Army had not been identified, they were:

- (1) The 14th Armored Division, which was in an assembly area near Charmes (Z9376).
- (2) The 103rd Infantry Division, which had begun to enter the lines on 9 November, 10 days before the map had been posted.

Early in the campaign it came to the attention of this headquarters that for some unknown reason an unusually large number of people posing as representatives of first one intelligence agency and then another made their appearance in the Army Group zone. Investigation revealed that in nearly every case these people were authorized to be here but it was obvious that some method of control had to be inaugurated in order for us to know with a certainty who was authorized to move about in the areas of the Armies and who, though posing as a legal representative of some unit, might, in reality, be working for the GIS. In order to control travel of Allied personnel in the army areas a pass

system was established. Due to the fact that the Army Group had the First French Army under its command it was necessary to devise a dual language pass system. Moreover, it was found necessary to establish two types of dual language passes; one for intelligence personnel on a particular intelligence mission known as an "Intelligence Pass"; and one for other personnel whose duties required travel in the army areas, and would permit the bearer to pass through the road blocks and check points. This latter pass was of three different types, one for officers of the Allied Armies, one for enlisted men and one for civilians. The need for these passes became evident when it was learned that as a result of an inquiry some 25 different intelligence groups were working out of SHAEF Headquarters in Paris on various unrelated missions.

In October 1944 the first cards of four sets of the Central Personalities Index were received by the Counter-Intelligence Section. The Central Personalities Index, published by the Evaluation and Dissemination Section of SHAEF, C.I., is made up of cards containing information on wanted persons in Germany, filed alphabetically according to the name of the person. The cards are of two colors, buff and pink; the buff cards contain information on wanted persons other than German Intelligence personnel; the pink cards are reserved for German Intelligence personnel.

The four sets of cards received were distributed as follows: Securite' Militaire, First French Army; G-2 (CI) Seventh U. S. Army; S.C.I. Detachment, 6th Army Group, and one set was kept in the Personalities sub-section. When originally furnished this headquarters, the sets numbered about 25,000 cards each. By June 1945 the sets contained about 110,000 cards. One of the duties of the personalities sub-section was to distribute the additional cards that arrived, and to supervise the maintenance of the four sets of cards.

In addition, new cards were made locally, the material coming from such sources as interrogation of captured German agents, interrogations of Prisoners of War, captured files, etc.

The Personalities sub-section also built up a library of other personality information, largely from material produced by the Evaluation and Dissemination Section in London. This included lists of SS personnel, SS promotion lists, lists of German General Staff officers, and many miscellaneous compilations of personality information concerning German administrative officials.

The Evaluation and Dissemination Section soon began to publish "grey material", which referred to names of persons in Germany whom it was believed might be friendly to the Allies. This information was handled in a fashion similar to that contained in the Central Personalities Index.

Prior to arrival of 6th Army Group troops in Germany, the Central Personalities Index was combed, and all information on persons in approximately three hundred cities, which it was believed would be in the path of the 6th Army Group advance, was copied on to "Target Sheets". A target sheet was provided for each wanted individual, and these target sheets were filed by city. As troops approached each city, the targets for the locality were forwarded to the G.I.C. team which was to enter the town.

When our troops reached Germany, the personalities sub section began to record information concerning persons arrested by the Seventh U.S. Army and the First French Army. For each person of Counter Intelligence interest who was arrested by either of these armies an arrest report which contained all of the pertinent data pertaining to the individual arrested, plus the reason for the arrest, was forwarded to the sub-section. Here the information was extracted and placed on cards, which were filed alphabetically according to the name of the suspect. The arrest reports themselves were forwarded to 12th Army Group after the pertinent information was extracted from them here. 12th Army Group published the information from these reports in an abbreviated form, along with arrests made by its own armies, and all information was recorded on machine records. At the time the Seventh Army was transferred from the control of 6th Army Group, approximately 1400 of their arrests had been processed; the French Army through 8 July 1945 had made approximately 700 arrests which were processed.

It soon became obvious that it would be necessary to make arrangements for the installation of civil communications censorship in occupied territory. To provide for this contingency a Civil Censorship in Germany Detachment was sent to this headquarters from ETOUSA and was under the supervision of the CI Section of the Group G-2. CI duties in connection with the work of this detachment included the supervision and the interpretation of directives and policies dealing with Civil Censorship in Germany. They also included the rapid seizure of all civilian mail which they obtained from the post offices in the various towns and villages as these were overrun by our troops. This mail was searched for possible documents of importance to ourselves or the Armies and the remainder shipped to SHAEF who further exploited the information contained by a close scrutiny of the letters and documents.

The problem of supervising and controlling Counter Intelligence activities in the First French Army entailed the reconciliation of different points of view and differing emphasis on the importance of various phases of the task. For example the French were naturally concerned with matters which affected France during the period of the German occupation and tended, therefore, to place more importance on following up and apprehending French renegades (P.P.F., Milice, etc.) than German agents charged with

missions directly affecting the then current military operations. It was likewise difficult for them to understand our procedures with respect to the rendering of reports and the interchange of Counter Intelligence information. The difference in languages further added to the difficulties and retarded rapid communications. While the Group Headquarters was still at Lyon, a detachment of French Securite' Militaire personnel was added as a part of the Counter Intelligence Section to act as a liaison section. This section was made up of French officers and enlisted men and was gradually enlarged until, in the final operations in Germany, it comprised six officers under a Lieutenant Colonel and six enlisted men. The liaison made possible by this detachment was invaluable in connection with the transmission of directives to the Counter Intelligence personnel with the First French Army and in creating the necessary understanding as to the procedures to be followed plus clearing up the difficulties that arose.

To aid in the security of the Headquarters while stationed in Vittel, France, a comprehensive network of local informants was developed through Headquarters CIC Detachment. This included personnel resident in 18 neighboring towns and covered an area within a radius of 25 kms of Vittel which totalled some 1964 square kms (707 square miles). Telephone communications were established with these towns and the necessary procedure set up to alert the Headquarters in case of enemy action, such as might result through agents, parachutists, etc. Furthermore, this network was successful in the recovery of missing personnel and materiel.

Early in the campaign a study and reconnaissance was made of the security situation along the Franco-Swiss border and recommendations were submitted to higher headquarters for measures intended to increase the effectiveness of border control. On the occasion of the invasion of Germany careful attention was given by this section to the Franco-German, German-Swiss and Swiss-Austrian borders which required that immediate steps be undertaken by the armies to insure that these vital borders would be sealed in order to prevent the escape of war criminals and Nazis. This was done and was closely supervised by the armies through the establishment of border guards. These installations eventually covered a length of 387 miles. Among other things this sealing of the border required the establishment of a zone 5 km in width extending from the border into Germany. In this zone some areas were completely evacuated of civilians and the remainder of the area was organized into what was called a restricted zone in which the travel of residents was only permitted for a distance of 6 kms from their homes. Passages and roads leading through this 5 km band, not defined as avenues of communication, were required to be wired off as well as blocked off by suitable means in order to prevent unauthorized use. Careful patrol, both by air and land, was necessary to maintain an airtight frontier. This office aided in establishing and maintaining the control, particularly in the First French Army area, and our representative made numerous inspection trips with French officers in order to set up and super-

wise this vast undertaking.

In October it was appreciated that when the Armies entered Germany there would be many installations and personalities of Counter Intelligence interest that would be overrun as they advanced. As the lower units would not have the many and complete sources of information about these targets which were available to this headquarters it was decided that all target information be developed at this level and such information be compiled and set up in a flexible system for easy distribution to lower echelons when needed. Hence a target sub-section was established in the Counter Intelligence Section for this purpose.

As only the particular unit overrunning a single target would be interested in information concerning it, the decision was made that a separate target sheet would be made up for each target, to be kept at this headquarters until needed. Thus, it was simple to add additional information to the targets as it became available since it only had to be typed on the one sheet. A dossier was set up for each town having a Counter Intelligence target in Southern Germany in the possible zone of advance of either of the Sixth Army Group Armies. Included in each dossier were the target sheets for that town and, when available, town plans, aerial photos and reports of bomb damage. Target sheets were also made out for the personalities listed on the SHAEF cards and shown as indigenous to the area of the advance. By February this work was completed as far as available information made possible and turned over to the Seventh Army to be kept up to date and to be more readily accessible when needed. When the targets were given to Seventh Army there were dossiers for over 765 towns. These contained over 5000 targets. The targets were so set up that, as the Corps boundaries were defined, all dossiers for towns within the zone thus established for any single corps could be easily withdrawn and forwarded. Likewise, this same process could be repeated as Division boundaries moved forward. The area covered in this task included all of GERMANY south of a line from SAARBRUCKEN, FRANKFORT to PLAUE. This included all of Wehrkreise V, VII, XIII, and parts of Wehrkreis IX and XII as well as areas in CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA. When the compilation of these targets was first begun the magnitude of the task was not realized and as the work progressed the advantages of a flexible system as described above became readily apparent. When turned over to Seventh Army these targets were in such form that one man could easily post the additional information that came in from day to day.

In addition to the Seventh Army and the First French Army this Army Group had under its control the front from Switzerland to the Mediterranean facing Italy. Here the Counter Intelligence situation, particularly around Cannes and the Mediterranean, was rendered difficult. The terrain favored the passage of line crossers, both by sea and land. It was not an active front, but this did not prevent the GIS from endeavoring to send its spies into France in order to obtain information as to our troop dispositions and

probable intentions in this sector. From the middle of November 1944 until the latter part of March 1945, a detachment of CIC officers and agents from this headquarters was on duty with the 44th AAA Brigade which was holding this sector. This detachment apprehended 10 enemy agents and instituted such security measures as prevented the GIS from obtaining any information of consequence regarding our intentions on this front. Counter Intelligence found it necessary in the Menton area to evacuate the entire town, as well as an island just off the coast, in an endeavor to combat the earnest efforts of the GIS to send their spies across the lines by boat as well as by road. Additional small towns in mountainous regions adjacent to the coast were likewise evacuated and close control was maintained by means of road blocks and control posts on all highways leading to and from Italy.

In addition to the activities in the field with the Armies, the need for providing adequate security for our own headquarters as well as for the personnel themselves became apparent. Particularly was it important to see to it that the Commanding General was provided with an airtight security setup which would permit no access to him except by authorized and legitimate means, whether he was on the road or in the headquarters. This necessitated a careful check of the premises to be occupied by the General on the part of the CIC Detachment. A survey was then made and recommendations given for the posting of guards in vulnerable places. Following this a system of continual checks on the office and quarters of the General was conducted so that any possibility of laxness developing could be forestalled.

Counter Intelligence found it necessary at an early date to work closely with the Hq. Comdt. and to initiate security policies to be followed. It was likewise found expedient and necessary, not only to promulgate needed measures which must be followed, but to check up on the personnel in order to see that we had an airtight and foolproof system. Although this matter of the security of the headquarters was a small part of our duties in contrast to the activities of the Armies in the field, it did occupy a great share of our time and took up the efforts of a good part of our personnel. To aid us in this there was maintained and attached to this office a CIC Detachment which we located separately in each of the towns the headquarters occupied. They were used exclusively to attend to the ever increasing needs of the headquarters and, over the period of the campaign, it was found expedient to enlarge the size of the detachment by as much as five times the number originally used at the beginning of operations in Southern France. In order to get an insight into the detailed activities of this unit it might be well to list their accomplishments. These duties were carried out in each of the localities where either an advanced or a main headquarters was established to-wit: Vittel, Phalsbourg (twice), Landstuhl, Kaiserslautern, Heidelberg, Kauffburen. In many cases it was necessary to operate in two cities at the same time due to the headquarters having an advance and a rear echelon. Moreover, it was necessary that each of the following measures be carried out in all of the towns in which the headquarters was established. Prior to a move

the detachment set themselves up in the new location and:

- a. Cleared the area of persons constituting security threats such as Gestapo or SD agents, dangerous Nazis, etc.
- b. Insured the checking of all headquarters buildings and areas for mines, time bombs and booby traps.
- c. Made recommendations relative to the posting of MP and other security troops in order to obtain the maximum security for installations, personnel and materiel.
- d. Contacted local military and civilian authorities on matters of mutual interest so that all worked in harmony and towards one purpose.
- e. Screened civilian residents in the vicinity of headquarters and billets of important officers, and also all civilians to be employed by the headquarters.
- f. Established an informant network throughout the locality.

After the headquarters had been established, the activities listed above were continued, but in addition the following tasks were carried out:

- a. Periodic checks were conducted in order to determine the sufficiency and efficiency of the guards on all installations, in order to make recommendations for improvements.
- b. Surveys were made to determine the security of information and to insure the strict observance of AR 380-5 relative to classified matter.
- c. When there appeared to be a need for special precaution against enemy espionage or sabotage agents, all troops in the area were alerted. Examples of this occurred when parachutists were reported at the time of the "breakthrough" in December 1944, as well as when threatened subversive activity was anticipated on Hitler's birthday.
- d. Recommendations were made relative to civilian and military roadblocks and periodic inspections carried out to determine whether they were properly placed and efficiently operated.
- e. Investigations were conducted on army personnel to be utilized on cryptographic duties.

Frequently it was the task of Counter Intelligence to carry out investigations on matters which in reality were in the realm of the CID. However, due to the absence of such a unit with the

headquarters these tasks fell to the lot of CI. A number of these activities were engaged in off and on by our people but perhaps the most interesting one which came to our attention and certainly the most successful was that of a case involving the loss and subsequent recovery of a two and a half ton signal truck. This truck containing highly classified signal corps equipment was stolen from the Signal Detachment of the 28th Infantry Division on the night of February 5-6, 1945 in Colmar, France. The Commanding General placed the task of recovering this truck and its contents in the hands of Counter Intelligence. The importance of the successful recovery of this materiel can in no particular be overestimated. It was important not only to the Armies in the field in all theaters but to the government of the United States as well. This was clearly emphasized by the pressure put on by Washington and SHAEF alike. In conducting this search, which, in all truth, was like searching for a needle in a haystack, Counter Intelligence eventually employed some fourteen different intelligence agencies other than its own. These included civilian agencies such as the Surete Generale of France. No stone was left unturned in this all-out search which eventually covered all of France. Success in this venture was finally obtained after six weeks of intense effort which resulted in the recovery of the truck and its contents, intact and uncompromised.

The coordination of espionage activities on the part of the Army Group likewise fell to the lot of Counter Intelligence. Engaged in this work in the 6th Army Group were two different agencies. One was the attached SCI unit which worked with the American forces and the other was known as the T.R. unit and was set up and operated by the French. It became obvious early in the campaign that coordination between these two was necessary if duplication or contradiction of effort was to be avoided in the Army Group. As a consequence, this office took upon itself the task of bringing about close coordination between the two agencies. Frequent conferences were held and, with the appointment of an overall control head who handled the espionage work, this problem was finally solved. All material and information given the agents who were sent across our lines was carefully screened and coordinated so that no duplications or contradictions with former similar activities was obtained.

The efforts of Counter-Intelligence in carrying out its many and often not clearly defined duties during the campaign in France and Germany has been briefly outlined above. It is not to be expected that complete success crowned our efforts; however, on the credit side it can be pointed out that no sabotage of any importance took place within the Army Group area; no subversion was evident among our own troops; the efforts of the GIS to penetrate our area by means of spies was well taken care of and the security of our own installations and headquarters was self-evident by the lack of any incident of consequence in connection with our personnel or installations.

CHAPTER 4

"T" SECTION

MISSION ASSIGNED

With the entry of Allied troops into Germany, it became apparent that some further coordination of intelligence targets in the area was necessary. The vast number of targets of all types, industrial, military, ministerial, and governmental, required some system of control, in order that duplication of research and investigation be prevented. Accordingly, a system of "T" Branches was formed, and the exploitation of intelligence objectives was coordinated through these units. Such branches were established at all echelons, from Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F., through the Army Groups and Armies to Divisions. In each case, "T" Branches were placed under the control of the G-2 Section of the unit concerned.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, at 6th Army Group, assigned to "T" Section the mission of coordinating the "T" Sections of Seventh Army, French First Army and "T" Force, 6th Army Group. In addition, it was given the task of establishing a Specialist Camp for the reception, billeting, authenticating, and supervising of the intelligence specialists ordered into the area by "T" Sub-Division, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F., in which, by direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, visiting specialists could obtain a maximum of comfort and facilities for expediting their work. It similarly was given the function of providing and maintaining a security system, whereby none but properly accredited specialists could gain access to the intelligence targets.

FUNCTION OF SECTION

Prior to the operation of the Specialist Camp, a uniform system was evolved with "T" Section, Seventh Army, and "T" Section, French First Army, whereby all known intelligence targets in the area of 6th Army Group received a dossier, and were posted in map libers, which were forwarded through channels to the "T" Sections of all lower echelons. In addition, copies of the maps, with the locations of the targets superimposed, were forwarded to the Headquarters of the units responsible for the seizure of the areas involved. In this way, uniform information as to future targets was disseminated to all interested units. This information was compiled by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Seventh Army, and under direct supervision of the "T" Section Chief, from sources including CIOS, CI, G-5, G-1, and other intelligence agencies. Certain additional MIS personnel, to augment Seventh Army "T" Section in this work, was furnished by 6th Army Group. At the same time, "T" Force, 6th Army Group, continued to function, its activities being limited to the seizure, safeguarding and exploitation of targets in Frankenthal, Ludwigshafen, Mannheim, Karlsruhe, Heidelberg, Wuerzburg, Stuttgart, and Munich.

It was further understood that field operations would uncover a vast quantity of targets, and arrangements were consummated whereby as combat

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troops advanced into and occupied enemy territory such targets would be seized and safeguarded, and information concerning them would be immediately transmitted through channels to "T" Section, 6th Army Group. There this additional information would be coordinated with that already received, entered upon the proper maps and in the appropriate dossiers, and intelligence agencies would be promptly notified that the target was ready for exploitation. In the actual operation of the section, it was discovered that such targets constituted the more valuable intelligence objectives. Actual experience disclosed, further, that such targets constituted approximately 70 percent of all exploited targets.

The actual operations of "T" Section commenced on 25 March 1945, at which time headquarters was established in the city of Kaiserslautern, Germany, and the Specialist Camp was formed. For increased efficiency of operation, and to provide closer liaison between "T" Section and the intelligence specialists, both the Section and the Specialist Camp were merged into one unit, and were housed in the same building. A Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached to Headquarters, 6th Army Group, and an augmented company, together with all available Battalion transportation was placed under the control of "T" Section. This company provided transportation, drivers, mess, billeting, and service personnel for the Section and the Camp.

The staff of "T" Section was formed from an IPW team, attached by verbal orders from a pool of MIS personnel at "T" Force, and an officer from another IPW Team similarly attached, a trained document specialist. The team itself was charged with setting up a target section, consisting of a complete filing system of targets in the 6th Army Group area, facilities for recording any targets newly discovered, and means for keeping a running check on the exploitation of the targets. In addition, a situation map was posted. The document specialists took over the work incident to the activities of the visiting intelligence specialists, including the setting up of a system for the evacuation of essential documents, through channels, to the accredited agencies at higher echelons. Other administrative personnel, consisting of an Executive Officer, a Teams and Transportation Officer, and mess and billeting personnel, was attached from the Battalion.

Between 25 March 1945 and 28 March 1945, when the first specialists checked into camp, the staff and personnel of the Section were engaged in assembling the necessary target information, preparing dossiers and files on all targets, indexing them and setting up the administrative details necessary to provide a target service which would fulfil the needs of the specialists. In addition, transportation was arranged and the physical facilities for the reception of the personnel were installed. At this time also, a pass system was set up whereby, with the issuance of an intelligence pass, the specialists and the specialists alone would gain access to intelligence targets in the entire area of 6th Army Group. For this purpose, the 6th Army Group Pass was used in Seventh Army area, and this pass, together with the French Laisser Passer, provided entry into targets in the area of First French Army. It appeared later, however, that the value of the 6th Army Group Pass for this purpose was limited by its use by others than intelligence specialists. Accordingly, in April, the use of

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this pass was abandoned, and a special "T" Section Intelligence Pass was issued only to duly authenticated intelligence specialists.

On 28 March 1945, seventy-six assessors arrived directly at Kaiserslautern by plane from the United Kingdom. The procedure adopted, which has been followed consistently since, was that the planes were met at the airstrip by the officer of Teams Branch, they were conducted to the Headquarters, billeted, and welcomed by the Sub-Section Chief, who at the same time issued to them a resume of the regulations and procedural rules established. While this processing was going on, the Teams Branch, which had been furnished with a copy of the travelling orders, was engaged in authenticating the specialists and issuing the proper passes enabling them to visit the intelligence targets to which they had been ordered. Without delay, therefore, the staff commenced functioning actively, and the specialists were enabled the next day to commence their investigations.

For the initial period, operations proceeded out of the Headquarters at Kaiserslautern, but the rapid advance of Seventh Army elements, and the number of intelligence targets discovered on the East Bank of the Rhine, necessitated moving the Headquarters. Accordingly, on 7 April 1945, the entire Section, including the Specialist Camp, was removed to Heidelberg, chosen because of its central position and because its close proximity to 6th Army Group Headquarters facilitated the flow of communications.

Moreover, it was discovered that Heidelberg had become a dispersal center for very important industrial personalities and documents. In particular, the personnel and documents of I.G. Farben and Brown Bovari and Co., both intelligence targets of high priority, were discovered in Heidelberg. To facilitate the work of the specialists and at the same time to safeguard both documents and personnel with a minimum guard detail, a Document Center was established in the Library of the University of Heidelberg, in which were assembled the documents of these and other targets, and where facilities, including office space and typewriters, as well as interpreters and translators, were made available to interested specialists.

The vast amount of high priority documents discovered at this time, which proved to be of interest to more than one assessment or investigation team, and to more than one agency, revealed the immediate need for some type of reproduction unit, capable of photographing the documents for wider distribution. A mobile microfilming unit was requested of Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F., but, to serve in the interim, existing German equipment, located in Heidelberg was requisitioned and installed in the Document Center.

Shortly before the cessation of hostilities, it became apparent that the area to the south and east could not conveniently be reached from Heidelberg. Since, however, people were still operating in the area north and west of that city, it was felt desirable to establish a CP in or around Munich, leaving a rear CP and small Specialist Headquarters in Heidelberg. This was accomplished, and on 4 May 1945, Headquarters was established in a suburb of Munich. Thus, with a minimum of inconvenience, intelligence specialists were able to operate throughout the entire 6th Army Group area.

In the period of operation of "T" Section to date, the camp has received, billeted, serviced, and furnished transportation, interpreters, and other facilities to approximately twelve hundred (1200) investigators, billeting and messing approximately one hundred seventy-five (175) daily. Approximately seven hundred (700) assessment reports have been filed by these investigators and these reports, together with pertinent documents and materiel have been forwarded, by "T" Section, through channels, to the appropriate intelligence agencies at Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F., in Great Britain and in the United States.

ORGANIZATION: SUB-SECTION CHIEF

In addition to the normal functions of command, the chief personally conducts a nightly meeting of the leaders of the seven CAFT Teams, and the leaders of other groups operating in the area under the jurisdiction of "T" Section. These meetings are held at a convenient hour each night in order to provide a closer liaison between the Section and the Intelligence specialists. At this time, any new information of interest to the specialists is placed before them for their information and comment. The leaders are encouraged to bring to the meeting problems incident to the operation of the teams and an attempt is made to arrive at solutions of such problems mutually agreeable to the Section and the Team Leaders. In addition, each team reports on the results of its investigations. On frequent occasions, other teams thus profited by information so given. New opportunity targets, reported by the Armies are given to the Leaders. Assessors to cover these are assigned. Transportation for the following day is arranged and the Leaders are invited to discuss any problems which may have arisen.

At one period in the operation of the Section, at a time when troops were advancing slowly against heavy opposition, a project developed as a result of a discussion held at these meetings whereby the CAFT Leaders, operating jointly, furnished a reconnaissance party of specialists who, for lack of assigned and known targets, reconnoitered the area already taken, uncovering thereby some valuable and previously unknown intelligence targets.

Moreover, the nature of the work performed by the intelligence specialists, and the multiplicity of problems which arise, necessitate conferences between the Chief and the specialists at all hours of the day and night. Many of the problems discussed required coordination with other units of echelons. For this reason, Liaison Officers of the Armies and Twelfth Army Group are in constant attendance at the Headquarters and are frequently consulted.

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

The Executive arranges for and supervises all communications issued by the specialists. He confers constantly with them and acts as liaison between them and the sub-section chief. In addition, he acts in the capacity of dissemination officer, distributing all incoming correspondence and publications among members of the staff and the intelligence specialists.

CAMP COMMANDER

The Camp Commander is responsible for the billeting, messing and servicing, physically, of the specialists and staff. Under his guidance, arrangements are made whereby each intelligence team or group is billeted together, and have at their disposal an individual office equipped with desks, typewriters and other facilities for expediting their work.

TARGETS BRANCH

The targets Branch coordinated the work of the Targets Sections of Seventh Army and French First Army. It maintains a complete filing system of all targets known to exist in the area, based on the dossiers received from the armies and on intelligence received daily through normal channels. By this means, through close contact with the Armies, all intelligence personnel is kept informed of all seizures of known and opportunity targets. A situation map is posted and kept up-to-date twice daily, thereby enabling the teams to plan exploitation of targets in accordance with the progress of the troops. Upon completion of assessment or investigation, a report is rendered, appropriate entries made in the target dossiers and a copy of the report is retained in the files of the Section. The situation map likewise indicates the location of all targets, together with a daily report of progress in the evaluation of the target.

TEAMS BRANCH

The teams Branch receives and authenticates specialists, issues passes and arranges team transportation. In addition, it arranges passage for the specialists by air to Paris or the United Kingdom. Further, frequent liaison is maintained by telephone and personal visits with "T" Sub-Division, Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F., 6th Army Group and Armies.

MATERIEL BRANCH

The Branch arranges for the evacuation of materiel, through channels, to the rear. In addition, it advises the specialists on questions concerning materiel and coordinates their work with that of Technical Intelligence Teams operating in the area.

DOCUMENTS AND PERSONALITIES BRANCH

The Branch arranges for the evacuation of documents from repositories, safeguards them where necessary, and evacuates documents upon request to Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F., Documents Section, earmarked for other intelligence agencies. In addition, the branch instituted and operated the Document Center, Heidelberg, described above. Moreover, the Branch arranges for the detention, securing, and interrogation of personalities of interest to the specialists.

An organization chart of "T" Section is shown in Figure 7.

T-SECTION 6TH ARMY GROUP




Figure 7

CHAPTER 5

"T" FORCE

BACKGROUND

Quotations from orientation talk given by the T FORCE Commander at the School for 6th Army Group Corps and Division Officers, which was conducted by the T FORCE Staff under direction of the A. C. of S., G-2, 6th Army Group, at Rosieres, France during February and March 1945.

"HISTORY

Somewhat over a year ago plans were laid for the offensive which had the city of Rome as its main objective. Many of you may have taken part in that offensive which culminated in the capture of Rome and the virtual destruction of Kesselring's 14th Army. When the first plans were laid for the offensive it appeared that Rome would be the first Fascist Capital to be taken by the Allies. Tactically this presented no new problem to the occupying troops - but from the high level intelligence point of view as well as politically, it was sure to be a great prize.

British Intelligence, always very much on the ball when it comes to high level international and strategic intelligence, realized that the problem of handling and absorbing the vast and varied sources of intelligence in a great international city such as Rome, was no simple matter. To cope with this complex problem, and to evolve a plan which would satisfy the many agencies having intelligence interests in Rome, it was decided to organize a joint American-British Special Headquarters composed chiefly of intelligence trained personnel. It would take too long to discuss the many problems connected with the planning and preparation of this first "T" Force or Intelligence Assault Force, then called "S" Force. Briefly, however, there were some twenty or more separate agencies interested in intelligence targets or objectives in Rome including the US War Department and US Navy Department, the US Air Corps, The Royal Navy, the British Foreign Office, the RAF, the US Department of State, the British Foreign Office, Allied Military Government, the Foreign Economic Administration, the FBI, OSS, CIC/FSP, M.I.-5 and 6, FWD, Censorship, and others, as well as the Theater Commander, AAI, and the Commanding General of the Fifth Army, the latter three however, having a greater interest in tactical military intelligence rather than in the strategic and political aspects of available information.

It was obvious that the G-2 Section of the Division, Corps, or Army in whose zone of operations Rome fell, would not have the facilities for handling such a complex problem and execute the tactical mission as well. Moreover, the level of interests was in

R E S T R I C T E D

many cases beyond that even of the Army. Plainly, it was the responsibility of some higher headquarters to handle this problem, and the result was "S" Force, organized by direction of the Theater Commander, AFHQ, to operate under direct control of the A. C. of S., G-2, AFHQ.

"S" Force Headquarters assumed the responsibility for research, preparation of target dossiers and the formulation of plans for entering Rome, seizing, guarding, and exploiting the multi-varied intelligence objectives therein. Months were devoted to planning and preparation for the operation. Italian information sources, particularly SIM (Servizio Informazione Militare) were very helpful in the research and planning phases and their contribution to the pool of information proved to be particularly reliable and voluminous.

"S" Force entered Rome on the night of the day the city fell - 5 June 1944. The ensuing operation which lasted approximately ten days, resulted in a remarkable "pay-off" in many categories of intelligence. The taking of Rome became a triple victory-Tactically, Politically and from the Intelligence aspect. The latter is now a matter of record, but its importance unquestionably has had its effect on the successful prosecution of the war.

The results of "S" Force Rome were so encouraging that it was decided to continue along the same general lines and operate similar intelligence assault forces in other large cities falling in the path of the Allied Advance.

These forces, now known as "T" Forces, have since operated in most of the large cities taken by Allied Troops.

This unit, "T" Force, 6th Army Group, was originally formed under the Seventh Army from officers who had participated in the Rome "S" Force operations. Working under the direction of the A. C. of S., G-2, Seventh Army and in conjunction with the First French Army, a small Intelligence Assault Force was formed, the Advance Party of which landed on D-day in Southern France and operated in Toulon and Marseilles when those cities fell. The Marseilles operation had not been completed when Lyons fell and another Advance Echelon of the Force entered Lyons and began operation. Smaller scale operations were thereafter conducted in Dijon and Bordeaux.

By the time the 6th Army Group had become operational in France, a SHAETF directive had already been issued directing the organization of a T Force under the Group and specifying certain cities in the 6th Army Group Zone of Operations as "T" Force target areas.

"T" Force, 6th Army Group, was then organized under the A. C. of S., G-2, 6th Army Group, most of the cadre for the organization having been taken from personnel of the Seventh Army original force.

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At that time it seemed that STRASBOURG would appear to be the most probable target city for the next "T" Force operation. Planning was initiated and dossiers were prepared. The operation began on 22 November and "T" Force, 6th Army Group entered STRASBOURG on 23/24 November while the city was still being cleared of the enemy. Here again the "pay-off" far exceeded anticipation. The Germans were completely caught off balance by the rapidity of the advance and the brilliant maneuvering of General LeClerc's Second French Armored Division. The tape in the telecrypter machines was still running when elements of "T" Force entered the Gestapo building. The first jet-propelled airplane motor to be taken intact was captured in the Matford SA Junkers 88 plant, together with secret design drawings and operational plans. Gestapo files, documents and much other important intelligence data were captured. The results were very gratifying.

So much for what constitutes a brief portrayal of the origin of "T" Forces, and in particular the history of "T" Force, 6th Army Group."

MISSION

The T Force Mission was clearly evident in three communications from Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, shown herewith:

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R E S T R I C T E D

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

SHAFF/9A/INT

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE)

27 July 1944

NUMBER 17)

'T' FORCE

1. It is hoped that the capture of large towns both in enemy occupied and enemy territory may mean that much valuable and special information including documents, equipment and persons, both enemy and others, may become available to the Allied Forces. It is proposed, therefore, to supply you with full information concerning such documents, equipment and persons which it is desired to seize or to put under guard pending their exploitation or removal. This information will normally be in the form of dossiers containing the relevant data including an estimate of the personnel required to carry out the tasks envisaged.

2. Arrangements will, therefore, be made for:-

- (a) Framing a plan for dealing with the targets in question.
- (b) Providing the necessary personnel to secure and/or guard the targets. In addition to combat and intelligence personnel it will generally be necessary to include some specialists such as engineers and signals, and also an administrative agency for general administrative purposes. Naval and Air requirements should be taken into consideration.
- (c) Arranging for the disposal of the seized documents, equipment and persons in accordance with the instructions in the target dossiers.

3. A small sub-division with a field element, has been formed at these Headquarters to handle such matters. This sub-division will supply you with the dossiers mentioned in para 1 above. The field element of the sub-division will be available for assisting in briefing the personnel who are to carry out the various tasks and for ensuring that you have all facilities and information which you consider necessary.

4. As the operations envisaged in this letter will grow in importance as we approach GERMANY and will assume particular importance in GERMANY itself, it is recommended that the personnel nominated to carry out these tasks should be placed under a single commander with a suitable staff and that they should be known as 'T' Forces. All agencies interested in the

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search for intelligence targets should be made subordinate to the 'T' Force Commander and should be under his absolute control and orders. In the ITALIAN Theatre the 'T' Force (S Force) has proved to be the most suitable vehicle for the integration of all intelligence assault missions which pertain to a single area regardless of the echelon of command which is basically responsible for them. The size and personnel of 'T' Forces will vary according to the target but may be as small as a FSP/CIC Section, but obviously in the case of city such as PARIS considerably greater.

It is essential that troops employed on these missions operate separately and independently from troops engaged in ordinary combat or occupational duties.

5. Many of the selected targets will be of a highly technical nature and it may be desirable to send specialists to examine them on the spot. In this case these Headquarters will make the necessary arrangements but the specialists will come under the orders of the 'T' Force Commander.

6. It is proposed to put forward to you in due course a preliminary list of 'T' Force targets and also to send to visit you the Officer in charge of the field element of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force 'T' Sub-division.

It is requested that you forward to these Headquarters the name of the Officer at your Headquarters who will deal with 'T' Force problems in order that his name may be notified to interested agencies.

7. This directive does not alter or supplant in any way the present arrangements in force for dealing with documents and technical intelligence.

By Command of General EISENHOWER:

s/ W. B. Smith

t/ W. B. SMITH

Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

s/ K.W.D. Strong

t/ K.W.D. STRONG

Major-General

A.C. of S, G-2

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

FORWARD HEADQUARTERS

GBI/EXEC/322-19

September 1944

SUBJECT: "T" Force Operations.

TO : BGS (Int), 21 Army Group
AC of S, G-2, Twelfth Army Group
AC of S, G-2, Sixth Army Group

1. With the entry of our forces into GERMANY, "T" Force operations will become increasingly more important.
2. Intelligence targets for "T" Force operations in any given area may include records and documents, persons, experimental and research stations, materiel, headquarters of all kinds, ministries, industrial plants, army, navy, and air establishments and installations.
3. "T" Force intelligence targets will be of interest to some, if not all, of the following agencies:
 - a. C.I.O.S. (an agency of the Combined Chiefs of Staff), representing both US and British Ministries.
 - b. Operational Intelligence.
 - c. Counter Intelligence.
 - d. Air Intelligence.
 - e. Naval Intelligence.
 - f. Censorship
 - g. Signal Intelligence.
4. This headquarters will furnish all available information relative to known targets and, where practicable, will furnish pin-pointed maps, town plans, and other relevant data. C.I.O.S. blacklists, geographically arranged have already been sent to all army groups along with other intelligence data; additional and supplementary data will be furnished as it becomes available.

5. It is expected that all army groups will form suitable "T" Forces, with a proper staff, and so organized as to be capable of seizing, guarding, and exploiting important intelligence targets. It is essential that

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targets are guarded until they have been fully exploited. In addition to combat and intelligence personnel, it will generally be necessary to include engineer and signal units, an administrative agency for general administrative purposes, and specialists groups, such as document teams, interpreter teams, safe experts, microfilm operators, etc.

6. All agencies interested in the search for intelligence targets in an area where a "T" Force is operating should be made subordinate to the "T" Force commander in order that he can properly coordinate the activities of all.

7. It is essential that "T" Force troops operate separately and independently from troops engaged in normal combat or occupational duties.

8. Many targets, especially those listed by the C.I.O.S., will be of a highly technical nature and it will probably be desirable to send specialists representing important US and British agencies to examine such targets on the spot. In such cases, this headquarters will make the necessary arrangements but, upon arrival at the target area, these specialists will come under the control and administration of the "T" Force Commander who will be responsible for providing necessary accommodations, transportation, guards and such facilities as are at his disposal to expedite the accomplishment of their mission.

9. Commanders of "T" Forces should be also instructed to effect the necessary coordination with naval and air field intelligence units or assault units so that full value is obtained from these sources for exploitation of targets.

10. Attention is invited to the booklet "Intelligence Assault Force Operations" which was published and distributed by this headquarters as a guide.

K.W.D. STRONG
Major-General, GS
AC of S, G-2

Copy to:

C.I.P. - AEAFF
S.I.O. - ANCKF

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R E S T R I C T E D

**SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.**

TO : A C OF S G-2 TWELFTH ARMY GROUP FOR SIBERT, BGS, (INT)
21 ARMY GROUP FOR WILLIAMS, A C OF S G-2 SIXTH ARMY GROUP

FOR INFO : SHAEF FWD (G-2 EXEC)

FROM : SHAEF MAIN FROM STRONG SIGNED EISENHOWER

REF NO : S-59890

Arrangements must be made whereby T Forces are so constituted as to be able to carry out fully the tasks assigned by Intelligence Directive 17 this Headquarters dated 27 July 1944. This includes plans for dealing with targets assigned, providing necessary personnel for seizing, guarding and exploiting targets, including exploitation when necessary by specialists provided by Combined Intelligence Objectives Committee which operates under authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. When such specialists are sent necessary arrangements must be made for reception, quartering, messing and transportation within the target area. Realize your great difficulties in providing these facilities at present time and we will endeavor to limit number of specialists sent. T Forces have already produced valuable results in spite of all difficulties and we are most grateful.

ORIGINATOR : G-2

AUTHENTICATION: t/A. S. KNIGHT
COLONEL

INFORMATION: SGS
AG Records

SMC CUT 5610 15 Sept 44 1953 B VAN/bfs REF NO: S-59890
TOO: 151745B

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In supplement of the above quoted directives outlining the general T Force Mission, T Force, 6th Army Group was assigned the cities of STRASBOURG, LUDWIGSHAFEN, MANNHEIM, HEIDELBERG, WURZBURG, KARLSRUHE, NURNBERG, FREIBURG, FRIEDRICHSHAFEN, ULM, AUGSBURG, STUTTGART, MUNICH, and BERCHTESGADEN for operations. (See Phase Map, attached to Copies Nos. 1 and 2 only). The complete mission was then categorized as follows:

Preparation of target dossiers pertaining to Intelligence Objectives within the T Force target cities; the formulation of plans for conducting T Force operations in all the cities listed as T Force target areas; the actual seizing and guarding and exploiting of the predetermined and dossierd objectives plus searching for and seizing of targets of opportunity; the maintenance of records on the disposition of all targets.

As an example of the T Force Mission in any specific city, Paragraph 2 of T Force Operations Plan Number 5 relating to Operation "Munich" is quoted herewith:

"T FORCE
6TH ARMY GROUP
WURZBURG

14 April 1945

OPERATIONS PLAN NUMBER 5.

2. MISSION.

- a. The T Force, 6th Army Group will seize and guard all predetermined targets of intelligence and counter-intelligence value in the MUNICH area and will also search for, and seize and guard all targets of opportunity including those targets which may have been evacuated from BERLIN and other parts of Northern Germany.
- b. The T Force will clear these targets of mines and booby traps and make them available for exploitation by specialists. When required the T Force will provide escorts for parties from higher headquarters interested in the technical exploitation of targets including enemy secret inventions or experiments, documents, laboratories and similar installations.
- c. The T Force will safeguard all documents and archives of permanent interest to Allied Military Government until responsibility for same has been properly transferred from the T Force.
- d. The T Force will coordinate and facilitate the work of all intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies operating in the target city."

METHOD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.

In order to accomplish its mission it became necessary to set up an organization which could plan and carry out operations of the above nature. This was done by preparing and having approved a Table of Organization of nine (9) officers and forty-three (43) enlisted men and an adequate Table of Equipment to conduct operations. A box-graph attached to this report gives a picture of the organization of the Force. See Figure 8.

The main functions of the staff is listed as follows:

The Headquarters Commandant and T-4 Section studied the requirements of assembling equipment, tentage, mess, etc., and administration for the handling of some three hundred intelligence investigators in the field if necessary.

The T-1 Section planned for the reception, checking of numerous orders, clearance, official correspondence for both T Force and visiting intelligence investigators, organized a Message Center, for official and other mail, and performed the duties of Adjutant.

The T-2 Section prepared thousands of target dossiers, pin-pointed town plans, and maps of areas of operations. Dossiers were prepared as a result of study of Black and Gray lists prepared by Higher Headquarters, interrogation reports, OSS and agent reports, as well as many targets sent in or submitted by agencies themselves.

The T-3 Section planned and prepared troop estimates on number of troops required to seize and hold the many targets in each city and prepared Operation Orders on the Intelligence assault of these cities.

As a result of well laid plans successful T Force Operations were conducted in many large cities. For the purpose of a brief picture of these operations refer to attached Phase Map. The operations here were divided into three phases which are as follows:

Phase I	STRASBOURG
Phase II	FRANKENTHAL-LUDWIGSHAFEN
	MANNHEIM
	HEIDELBERG
	KARLSRUHE
	WURZBURG
Phase III	STUTTGART
	MUNICH
	BERCHTESGADEN

The method of approach and intelligence assault on the above listed cities were as follows:

T FORCE 6TH ARMY GROUP




Figure 8

At all times T Force Headquarters would keep in close contact with the tactical situation by both personal reconnaissance and contact with other headquarters. When it became apparent that a city was about to fall, assault and seizure troops would be assigned to T Force by the Corps planning to take the city. T Force Headquarters, with attached troops, would approach the city and enter it with the troops taking the city and the many targets would be seized and guarded as sections of the city became cleared. T Force Headquarters would, at an appropriate time, call forward representatives of all interested intelligence agencies to exploit the targets seized.

RESULTS

Targets in the various towns allotted to T Force, already mentioned above, were exploited by target teams made up from the MIS and IPW teams who had been attached to T Force throughout their operations and/or by Specialist Agencies who joined T Force directly after each town had been entered and targets seized by T Force. Message had then been sent back to Specialist Agencies that targets were ready for them to exploit.

The duty of the target teams was to screen all targets for documents and collect at the documents centre those of prime importance for dissemination after specialist agencies had been given the opportunity for examining such in which they were interested.

Specialist agencies cleared any documents or enemy equipment which they wished to have removed through Documents Section or T-2 Section, and put in a report to T Force on each target exploited by them. Thus making information available to other Specialist Agencies.

Specialist agencies from whom representatives operated with T Force:

Signal Intelligence	G-2 SSS 7th Army	514 QM Gp TUSA
OSS/SCI	French Navy	Hq 8th Air Force
U S Navy	French SM	42d Division
ALSCS	French SRO	Air Tec Int
MIS	War Office	Hq 3d Air Div
Hq 2d Disarm. Wg.	EEIS	G-2 AFHQ
1st French Army	CIC French	G-2 War Dept
Nav Tec Mis Eu	Censorship, SHAEF	I. C.
G-5 6th Army Gp	G-2 6th Army Gp	9th Air Force
Admiralty	CIC, 6th Army Gp	XXI Corps
30 Assault Force	French Liaison	War Correspondents
USSTAF	USCC	TICOM
USSBS	Air Ministry	G-2 Seventh Army
CIOS	9th Air Disarm. Comm.	G-2 Third Army
Eco Sec, G-2 SHAEF	3d ECAR	39th Evac Hosp
CIC, 7th Army	3201 SIS Detachment	RASC
G-2 SHAEF	PWB, 12th Army Gp	HQ ETOUSA
Nav T Sub-Div SHAEF		

A total of fifty-two separate Intelligence Agencies.

R E S T R I C T E D

Below is given the number of specialist personnel from the above agencies who operated with T Force in each city:

STRASBOURG	132
FRANKENTHAL-LUDWIGSHAFEN	195
MANNHEIM	94
HEIDELBERG	81
KARLSRUHE	67
WURZBURG	92
STUTTGART	128
MUNICH	237
BERCHTESGADEN	182

From the above figures can be seen which towns were considered of prime importance from an intelligence point of view, and in fact the results proved these considerations to be correct.

The breakdown of targets within the separate cities is as follows:

Column A - Targets allotted by agencies prior to operation.
Column B - Targets of opportunity added upon arrival in area.
Column C - Targets unlocated.
Column D - Targets completely destroyed.
Column E - Targets investigated by interested agencies and Documents Section (Target teams).

<u>Target City</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>E</u>
STRASBOURG	53	13	15	0	51
FRANKENTHAL	14	4	2	2	14
LUDWIGSHAFEN	59	0	4	12	40
MANNHEIM	132	0	7	24	101
HEIDELBERG	63	10	2	0	71
KARLSRUHE	185	0	54	31	60
WURZBURG	101	6	1	32	74
STUTTGART	93	2	9	18	68
*MUNICH	348	81	62	52	315

* Includes BERCHTESGADEN

Types of Intelligence captured:

Allied Prisoner of War Files	Army Organization
Volksturm Organization	Aircraft Warning Systems
Nazi Party Lists	Police Records
List of Gauleiters	Captured Mail
Gestapo Organization Files	Aircraft Engineer Blueprints
Layout of Mine Fields in Denmark	Lists of Deserters
Criminal Records	Assorted Maps
SS, SA, and SS Personality Files	Fortification Data
SIPO Records	Plans of Underground Factories
NSKK Organization	Industrial Maps
NSV Organization	Industrial Organization
Hitler Youth Organization	French SS List
Concentration Camp Lists	Chemical Warfare Correspondence
List of Foreign Residents	Russian SS in Germany
Psychological Warfare	German Army Personnel

The above are examples of some of the types of intelligence captured. A full list of all intelligence forwarded has already been given in the full T Force Report, and it is impossible to give here the full details of such intelligence.

In addition many industrial and war plants were exploited, including underground plants, aircraft works, naval plants, tank MT plants, Luftwaffe Headquarters including Headquarters Luftgau VII, at Munich, I. G. Farben plant at Ludwigshafen. Many files were captured of value to G-5 and Military Government, and many Party Headquarters were also exploited.

G-5 successfully recovered many art treasures stolen by the Germans.

Among the high lights, were the first undamaged jet-engine taken at Strasbourg in November 1944, the OKH situation maps for the whole war taken at Berchtesgaden, and the Russian Order of Battle down to Divisions on the Eastern Front, and order of battle and latest information on the Russian Air Force.

A large number of personalities were captured including the directors of I. G. Farben taken at Ludwigshafen and Heidelberg and many high ranking party members taken in Munich, also members connected with the Werewolf movement.

CHAPTER 6

LESSONS LEARNED

GENERAL

1. There are too many G-2 publications by too many G-2's. Some G-2's are inclined to judge their success by the quantity and size of the endless reports and documents produced by their sections, rather than how they keep their commanders informed of the strength and capabilities of the enemy. The publication of massive, gaily bound documents containing non-essential information is a waste of critical supplies, critical tonnage and critical manpower and, to carry the vicious circle even further, a waste of the time of the staffs of subordinate units who read them.

No commander in war has time to read a fifty-page G-2 report or estimate. If the G-2 has essential information for his commander he should be able to reduce the report to at least two pages but preferably one-half page.

In addition to publications issued by the War Department there should be in each Theatre one agency charged with the publication and dissemination of information of a non-operational nature, such as details of new enemy equipment, new tactical trends, etc. In this theatre this agency should be SHAEF G-2. Subordinate echelons should funnel back to SHAEF G-2 all information of this character. SHAEF G-2 should evaluate this information, select that which is considered of value to lower echelons and publish and disseminate it. SHAEF has accomplished just this in this theatre and has done it well. But subordinate echelons should be prohibited from duplicating this work, thereby saving duplicate staffs, equipment and critical materiel.

2. In the history of warfare there has been no situation, after the start of a campaign, where the enemy could properly be credited with 8 to 10 true capabilities or lines of action. If the G-2, after a long-winded estimate, concludes with 10 enemy capabilities, he forsakes his role as a General Staff Officer and takes that of research expert who simply furnishes the commander all available information. The commander then must study and evaluate this information and decide which line of action the enemy will take. The G-2 has thereby escaped all responsibility. The G-2 should be able to reduce the enemy capabilities in most cases to one, and if there are more than one true capability he should have the courage to say which one is favored. The commander should require the G-2 to give to him definite and accurate information with regard to the enemy and assume full responsibility for it. If the G-2 is wrong he should be relieved in the same manner and as quickly as a commander of troops who fails.

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

1. ESTIMATION OF ENEMY STRENGTH

Utilizing certain captured enemy documents as a basis, the 6th Army Group G-2 Section developed what is considered the most effective method for determining the actual strength of the enemy. It was discovered that the enemy used three separate figures for rendering his own strength reports. Roughly they were equivalent to the ration strength of the unit with all attached personnel, the actual strength of the unit, and the strength in combat personnel only. By modifying this method somewhat, it became possible to evaluate correctly the statements of prisoners of war and information from captured documents in order to arrive at an accurate estimate. Furthermore, for planning purposes it was obvious that G-3 should receive an enemy strength estimate comparable in method of expression and accuracy to the known Allied strength figure. For such purposes, the practice of estimating enemy strength simply in number of divisions was definitely not satisfactory.

The principle was stated as follows: "The enemy strength figure given in 6th US Army Group Intelligence Summaries always represents the combat infantry effectives, unless qualified. It includes all personnel of the unit infantry or panzer grenadier regiments, the reconnaissance or fusilier battalion, and the combat engineer battalion. Supporting or auxiliary troops are not counted in the combat infantry effective strength, since estimation of their strength must usually be conjectural and without even the doubtful basis of the number of known casualties and interrogation reports. It is always assumed that a proportionate number of supporting troops, both divisional and GHQ, are to be added in order to arrive at a figure representing the enemy's overall combat strength."

Acceptance of the method was proposed on the arguments set forth below:

(a) The planning of an operation is based on the ratio between friendly and enemy infantry battalions, artillery pieces, and armored vehicles.

(b) The number of enemy infantry battalions can be determined through efficient interpretation of identifications. The strength of individual battalions must be carefully followed through interrogation of selected prisoners. Initial strength, replacements and reinforcements, and casualty losses can be tabulated by the maintenance of proper records and control of operational intelligence agencies in the field.

(c) Effective intelligence on the number of artillery pieces may be obtained from the shell reports of Army and Corps Artillery Officers. Fluctuation in the intensity of enemy concentrations can be used to check interrogation of the relatively few enemy prisoners who have knowledge of his artillery strength.

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(d) Enemy tank strength is determined in a manner similar to that used for infantry battalions; through identification of units and interrogation of armored force personnel.

(e) The normal sources of information cannot produce an accurate figure for supporting and auxiliary troops. The yield of prisoners from such units is consistently low both in number and quality by the very nature of their role. Ordinarily only scattered bits of information at widely divergent periods and from varying localities are available. However, to arrive at a figure representing the enemy's overall strength, it is possible and quite sufficient to estimate the proportionate number of supporting and auxiliary forces to be added.

(f) The practice of giving enemy strength in number of identified divisions is not satisfactory for other than purely symbolic war room purposes. In addition to presenting a false picture because of the many unknown factors included, it requires a knowledge of enemy organization not usually possessed by officers of other staff sections. Only particularly trained Intelligence Officers have sufficient background to interpret such a figure properly.

(g) It is obvious that this method of estimating enemy strength entails much work and careful attention to detail. The figures must be kept current at all times and must be constantly used to control interrogation of prisoners. On the other hand, it permits the rendition of immediate estimates of the enemy's strength and the quality of his troops. Finally, since the figures for any given locality under enemy control can be easily observed, not only the enemy's capabilities but even his intentions may be logically deduced. Upon such information the commander can base an immediate command decision or a strategic plan.

2. FUNCTIONS OF G-2 AIR

Operations in World War II required the institution of G-2 Air sub-section. Its functioning was naturally experimental, since there was no successful precedent. The experience at 6th Army Group brought forth two main points. In the first place, continuous close contact and cooperation between G-2 and A-2 staff officers was the primary requisite. In the second place, decentralization of operational agencies to lower echelons allowed the staff to remain a small group of highly trained specialists.

The organization of the G-2 Air sub-section was small and compact, consisting of three officers (a chief of section, a target officer, and a tactical reconnaissance officer) and three enlisted men. The small allotment of officers was made possible through complete decentralization of the operational intelligence agencies, specifically APID and photo interpretation teams, by attachment to armies. In this manner, the entire administrative duties were delegated and the officers at Army Group left free to devote their entire energies to the development and application of intelligence. The information produced was immediately available at the proper

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echelon and did not affect the quality of overall intelligence resulting, as all information filtered through G-2 Air.

The chief of section was made responsible for the daily coordination of all ground intelligence, including that produced by the air forces. The purpose of this coordination was two-fold: firstly, to determine the most effective employment of air power under existing circumstances; and secondly, to provide accurate estimates as to the effects of air attacks on enemy strength and capabilities. The constant personal contact allowed for continuous observation of the progress of the overall bombing program. If strategic changes occurred in enemy troop dispositions or stringencies developed in critical ammunition or supply items, it was possible immediately to warn lower operational commands. The chief of section was also responsible for maintaining a small file. It was to include a map sheet indicating the areas covered by all photographic reconnaissance with dates for specific zones, the broad policy directives governing future intentions, the routes to be covered by prearranged tactical reconnaissance, and the daily intentions of fighter bombers. He initiated the requests for additional photographic reconnaissance with G-3 Air. In addition his duties included the coordination and allocation of priorities for photo and tactical reconnaissance to be flown beyond the army zones of responsibility.

The target officer was responsible for the documentation and evaluation of all targets in the present and future zones of advance. He assumed the responsibility of seeing to it that the most opportune targets consistent with the success of ground operations were being bombed. Requests for cover of specific targets were coordinated with the chief of second and A-2 target section for possible available cover and then sent to G-3 Air for flying. The dealings between the target officer of G-2 Air and A-2 was on a direct personal basis for a rapid meeting of the minds. It was also his duty to see that army fighter bomber policy was in line with the overall air effort.

The tactical reconnaissance officer was responsible for receiving and disseminating results of aerial reconnaissance and all intelligence obtained by all air force agencies. This officer was particularly well-trained and knowledgeable as regards the enemy ground situation. This was necessary so that he could appreciate which reconnaissance routes and target areas would yield the greatest gain during a short succeeding period in relation to the effort expended. Furthermore, this officer like the other two must be cognizant of the limitations of reconnaissance and the number of targets which may be taken on by the air force in a single day. The most rapid means for receiving tactical reconnaissance or bomber results and observations was the channel supplied by the G-3 Air radio nets in contact with the operational airfields. Telephone conversations with lower echelons also aided the rapid receipt of information. An additional function of this officer was to keep G-3 Air fully informed of the situation in order that the ground liaison officers at airfields would be in a position to brief the pilots with intelligence requirements.

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The primary mission of the G-2 Air sub-section was to coordinate and supervise the needs of lower formations and participate in the setting in motion of broad overall policy with the air force staffs. Cooperation must be carried out on the basis of mutual respect. Specifically, methods for the employment of the air force should not be suggested by G-2 Air, but rather the results desired within a strategic concept should be set forth.

The air force was consistently without the latest ground intelligence. Therefore, it was one of the functions of G-2 Air to keep the A-2 fully informed of the tactical and strategical situation. There was an ever present willingness on the part of the air force to cooperate with the Army Group. On numerous occasions G-2 Air received informal requests for targets which would accomplish the objectives of the Army Group. However, this was done on a low level and appeared not to overstep the bounds of propriety by telling the air force "how to do it" but rather simply "what to do."

It is not recommended that the target or tactical reconnaissance sections of A-2 and G-2 be operated as a combined set-up. The reason is based on the lack of personnel sufficiently trained in both ground and air intelligence. The apparent duplication of effort is not harmful. The procedure will result in a healthy competitive spirit and will not permit the exertion of added strain on either ground or air intelligence staffs. The responsibility for producing evaluations of the effects of air attacks and reports on the status of communications belongs to G-2 Air.

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

During the operations in France and Germany, the Counter Intelligence Branch was called upon to blaze a trail under constantly changing conditions. Personnel trained in counter intelligence found frequent situations for which there was no precedent to guide in Counter Intelligence procedure. From these experiences certain lessons were learned which may have value for future operations.

1. To keep thoroughly abreast of the Counter Intelligence situation in an area as large as that of an army group, it is felt important that there be enough officers in the Counter Intelligence Section of the Group G-2 to maintain an intimate contact with lower echelons for the primary purpose of supervising the execution of directives from Group and higher headquarters. It not infrequently happened in both France and Germany that a Counter Intelligence officer from Group would have no one to whom he could delegate his routine duties to free himself for a field trip, with the result that the routine work, in some instances, was temporarily neglected while he took the trip, or the trip itself had to be abandoned. This would have been avoided had there been at least one junior officer in each sub-section of the Counter Intelligence Branch.

2. However carefully an organization chart is devised in advance to provide a delegation of responsibility for the various Counter Intelligence

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functions, it has been found that the special tasks and functions which develop in the progress of operations require considerable flexibility of organization to handle them, and make a predetermined T/O difficult to operate under. Thus, no previous experience indicated the need for personnel to handle such matters as the SHARP card index, the development of Counter Intelligence Target information, and the studies necessary to the organization of frontier control, the prohibited and restricted zones, etc. Some means of attaching officers to the T/O when these needs arise should be established.

3. The Chief of the Counter Intelligence Section of the G-2 Section should have complete control over all Counter Intelligence activities in the Group area. All Counter Intelligence agencies in the area such as C.I.C. and OSS/SCI should report to him, and the senior officer of each agency should be members of his staff. Armies, Corps and Divisions should have immediate operational control over such detachments of these agencies as may be attached to them, but for administration and supervisory control they should be under the Chief, CIB, of Group.

4. The problems incident to the security of Group Headquarters are responsibilities of Headquarters Commandant who should have on his staff an S-2 fully qualified to handle all phases of Headquarters security. The C.I.C. detachment of Group Headquarters should report directly to the S-2 and not to the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Branch of the G-2 Section.

5. When operations require the establishment of a Forward Headquarters, particularly in territory recently captured from the enemy, it is essential that the maximum advance notice of such a move be given to the S-2 of Headquarters Command. Then immediate action can be taken to send in C.I.C. personnel in advance to do the necessary screening of the local inhabitants with whom the officers and troops of the Headquarters will be in contact, particularly billet owners, town officials, etc., and to coordinate all matters relative to the security measures to be adopted. Likewise a counter intelligence officer from the Counter Intelligence Branch, G-2, should always be included in the staff going forward so that advantage can quickly be taken of the means thus provided for establishing closer contact with lower echelons.

6. Throughout the 6th Army Group during the operations in France and Germany, Counter Intelligence work has been handicapped by insufficient C.I.C. personnel. This has been further aggravated by the scarcity of linguists among the C.I.C. personnel available. When it is realized that C.I.C. are the sole working tools of counter intelligence staffs, it should be apparent that to take the field without sufficient personnel is the equivalent of sending in a combat team with inadequate artillery or lacking ammunition. A planned operation should include personnel proportionate in numbers to the task and provided with adequate linguists to cope with all languages to be encountered.

"T" SECTION

1. The CIOS plan for unified and coordinated exploitation of intelligence targets, in 6th Army Group area, had demonstrated the advisability of such a system. The various specialists have thus been enabled to work efficiently, with a minimum of administrative difficulties. Experience shows, however, that better facilities should be furnished by Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F., for providing clerical personnel. The preparation of reports and other paper work is time-consuming and, with the present facilities of "T" Section, it is impossible to provide clerical personnel in sufficient quantity.

2. It is essential in an undertaking of this nature that adequate transportation be furnished to allow investigators to make trips to each target in separate vehicles. The attachment of a Car Company to "T" Section would furnish this transportation and would also provide the personnel and facilities for adequate maintenance of the vehicles.

3. No investigators should be sent to "T" Section, 6th Army Group, until they have been thoroughly briefed in their mission by Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. It has happened on several occasions that investigators have been sent who know nothing of their objective, except that it lies in 6th Army Group area. All investigators should be sent forward only when specifically requested by the assessors, and only after they have been given opportunity to study the assessment report, with documents or material evacuated from the target.

4. Experience has shown that unit boundaries, because of their constant fluctuation, are unsatisfactory for determining the area to which investigators are sent by Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. At a conference with representatives of Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F., Twelfth Army Group, and Third Army, it was therefore agreed to establish an arbitrary "Planning Line", as a line of demarcation between "T" Sections. Such a system is suggested.

5. Since, as was demonstrated from the operation of "T" Section, 6th Army Group, assessment and investigation of industrial targets requires use of other intelligence facilities, it is suggested that in each army or Army Group an Intelligence Center be established, consisting of "T" Section, Specialist Camp, Interrogation Center, and Document Center.